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WHAT WOULD LEARNED HAND DO?: ADAPTING TO
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PROTECTING THE




Technological change invariably poses unique challenges to
lawyers and judges confronting its often jarring effects. Techni-
cal evolution puts pressure on our prevailing legal doctrine
(since the new processes or systems create novel, complicated
problems) and also on lawyers as they adopt new technology
into their practices.' For example, the unprecedented explo-
sion of electronic mail or "e-mail," the most popular application
on the Internet, has spawned myriad legal problems crossing
the doctrinal spectrum, from the privacy concerns implicated
by the review of e-mail by employers in the workplace to the
evidentiary issues relating to admission and authentication.2
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' See Lawrence P. Wilkins, Introduction: The Ability of the Current Legal
Framework to Address Advances in Technology, 33 IND. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) (identi-
fying two contexts in which inquiries of technological change arise: the "adoption
and use of technology in non-legal endeavors which enable new human capabili-
ties," and the "adoption and use of technology by lawyers, judges, and others
working in and with the law").
2 See, e.g., Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-Mail! Employee E-Mail Monitor-
ing and Privacy Law in the Age of the 'Electronic Sweatshop," 28 J. MARSHALL L.
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But the ubiquity of e-mail has also challenged lawyers inte-
grating the new technology into their practices, principally
spurring an animated debate about the propriety of using e-
mail for confidential communications with clients without
violating the attorney-client privilege.'
And it is not just e-mail that raises these concerns regard-
ing confidentiality. With the advent of online document reposi-
tories, cellular phones, handheld wireless computers, and in-
stant messaging, lawyers have all sorts of new and exciting
ways in which they can inadvertently breach their clients'
confidences. While these new technologies perform wonders for
uninterrupted, perpetual attorney-client communication, they
come with risks not only to the personal lives of law-
yers-whose marriages and other relationships may not sur-
vive yet another technological innovation that allows them to
work evenings, weekends, and vacations-but also of exposure
of sensitive attorney-client confidences. Lawyers learned long
ago not to chat about their cases in elevators or in crowded
restaurants, and a series of decisions within the Second Circuit
have taught them to take proper precautions in their document
production procedures lest they, say, inadvertently include an
internal confidential memorandum as an exhibit to a motion.4
But protecting a privilege that is now so easily violated at the
mis-touch of a button is difficult, and even more bewildering is
the uncertainty as to the precautions that should be taken by
the diligent and fashionably-wired attorney in using these new
REV. 139, 139-40 (1994) (discussing rights of employees to privacy in their email);
Andrew Jablon, Note, "God Mail". Authentication and Admissibility of Electronic
Mail in Federal Courts, 34 AMi. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1387-89 (1997) (discussing
evidentiary issues pertaining to e-mail).
' Compare David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client
Confidences by Internet E-Mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 506 (1998) (arguing
against a bright-line standard requiring encrypted e-mail) with Joshua M. Masur,
Comment, Safety in Numbers: Revisiting the Risks to Client Confidences and Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Posed by Internet Electronic Mail, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1117, 1158 (1999) (arguing that unencrypted e-mail is subject to interception).
' See Local 851 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Kuehne & Nagel Air Freight,
Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d. 127, 132-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that counsel's attaching
a privileged letter to a court filing, which had the same date and letterhead as
intended letter, waived privilege where counsel failed to take reasonable precau-
tions by failing to label the letter as confidential, to employ a procedure for sepa-
rating confidential communications, and to adequately review documents before
they left the office).
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communication technologies.
In the last five years, the American Bar Association (the
"ABA") and many state ethics boards have adopted a position
that sending confidential information through e-mail is no
more a violation of the attorney-client privilege than making a
telephone call or sending a facsimile, and that attorneys need
not take measures to secure their communications through en-
cryption or other protective technologies.' This consensus,
though, has developed without even one definitive court
ruling-indeed, a court has never considered the issue of
whether confidential e-mail communications are protected by
the attorney-client privilege.6 Moreover, the consensus devel-
oped at a time when the alternative to allowing privileged
communications through e-mail was to either bar such commu-
nications altogether, which was not a particularly popular
choice among lawyers enamored of the ease and simplicity of
the medium, or to allow the use of e-mail only if encrypted,
which was similarly unpopular because of the complexity and
cost of encryption programs at the time. Encryption technology
protects the contents of the e-mail, preventing anyone but the
intended recipient from reading it, but the technology of en-
cryption in the late 1990s seriously lagged behind e-mail tech-
nology, undermining the ease and simplicity that was e-mail's
appeal.
Several problems exist, though, with the position that e-
mail communication does not endanger the attorney-client
privilege. First, the fundamental assumptions underlying the
ABA's oft-cited opinion that e-mail is a secure-enough medi-
um7 are technologically dubious and represent a reliance on
an inappropriate analogy between e-mail and land-line tele-
phone calls.' The safety of e-mail communications is overstat-
ed, and attorneys who entrust sensitive material to the medi-
um are unnecessarily risking inadvertent disclosure. Second,
' See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413, at
Intro. (1999), available at http//www.abanet.org/cpr/fo99-413.html [hereinafter "ABA
Opinion"]; see also infra Part II.B.
' See, e.g., Michael R. Arkfeld, E-Mail-Revisiting Security Issues, 37-Sep. ARIZ.
ATTrY 12, 13 (2000) ("No one yet knows whether or not courts will determine that
sending an email message over the internet waives the attorney-client privilege.")
ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at § C.4.
See infra Part 1.C.3.
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this permissive standard could become a precedent for the new
generation of Internet applications that allow for attorney-
client communication, particularly with regard to shared online
documents and repositories. Lawyers are now enlisting the
services of online document repositories to enable lawyers to
share databases and working drafts from distant offices,9 and
lawyers are also creating "extranets," self-contained web-like
environments shared by attorneys and their clients, to provide
a common working space in which to exchange corresporndence
and share documents.' ° Essentially, the concern is that law-
yers, under competitive pressure to ensure the kind of immedi-
ate contact clients come to expect, will disregard security con-
cerns, assuming that Internet media is inherently safe because
the most visible Internet medium of e-mail has been declared
secure.
In this uncertain state of affairs, lawyers face the chal-
lenge of determining the appropriate set of precautions they
should take for protecting the attorney-client privilege in these
new communications media. Unfortunately, few courts have
established guidelines for protecting privilege when imple-
menting new technologies, requiring that we turn to other
doctrinal areas in which courts have established principles for
adapting to technological change. In this inquiry, on the forti-
eth anniversary of his passing, we can turn to the guidance of
Judge Learned Hand, who famously articulated principles for
setting a reasonable standard of care in implementing new
technologies in two landmark tort cases.1" The cases, The T.J.
Hooper v. Northern Barge Corporation2 and United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.," together establish what I will call Judge
' See infra Part III.A.1.
10 Id.
" Billings Learned Hand, who passed away in 1961 at the age of eighty-nine,
is not only one of the greatest judges to sit on the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, but is often "numbered among a small group of truly great American judges
of the twentieth century." See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND
THE JUDGE xv (1994). Judge Richard A. Posner, in a review of Gunther's biogra-
phy of Judge Hand, found that characterization to be somewhat understated,
recognizing that many consider Judge Hand to be "the third-greatest judge in the
history of the United States, after [Oliver Wendell] Holmes and John Marshall."
Richard A. Posner, Book Review: The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of
Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L. J. 511, 511 (1994).
12 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
13 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Hand's principles of technological integration: (1) reliance on
custom is no defense for a failure to adapt feasible and applica-
ble new technologies and (2) whether to integrate these new
technologies into practice depends on their costs versus the
severity and probability of injury. These principles were con-
ceived in negligence cases, but they nonetheless provide wis-
dom for examining whether attorneys should take precautions
when transmitting confidential client information through the
Internet. Essentially, lawyers should consider that their failure
to integrate available new technologies of encryption into pro-
tecting the attorney-client privilege will not necessarily be
mitigated by their reliance on prevailing custom that those
new technologies are not necessary; rather, in considering
whether it is feasible to adopt the new technologies, they
should consider the cost of integrating them in light of the
probability of accidental disclosure and the harm that would
result.
Indeed, these principles nicely enhance the test that courts
within the Second Circuit have established for evaluating
whether an attorney has inadvertently waived her client's
privilege, which depends primarily on the appropriateness of
the precautions set up to protect against disclosure. 4 But be-
cause no court has had to consider the types of precautions
necessary for new technologies, and the precedents are mostly
document productions cases that are not especially analogous,
Judge Hand's principles provide the most effective guidance for
determining whether lawyers should be charged with keeping
up with the state of the art.
The thesis of this Article is that in considering the level of
precautions necessary for transmitting information through the
new Internet technologies, lawyers applying these principles of
technological integration will find that the state of the art
requires implementing viable encryption software, for e-mail as
well as other online document transmissions. At the very least,
I submit that attorneys should pay careful attention to security
protocols when adapting new technologies into their practices,
especially where the technologies are complex and can rapidly
," See SEC v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (identifying factors
including level of precautions taken to protect privilege, scope of disclosure, time
taken to rectify error, and the overriding interests of justice). See infra Part III.B.
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change. Part I of this Article explores the dynamic of techno-
logical change, and establishes a four-factor analysis for evalu-
ating new technologies and how they might impact the prevail-
ing legal doctrine. Part II applies these principles to e-mail,
discussing how e-mail and encryption work, explaining the
consensus that developed regarding e-mail security and the
attorney-client privilege, and showing how that consensus
misunderstands the dynamic of technological change. Finally,
Part III examines applicable attorney-client jurisprudence
within the Second Circuit and explains how Judge Hand's
principles can guide attorneys through difficult and complex
choices.
I. EXAMINING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A FOUR-PART MODEL
An examination of the legal effect of a technological
change requires an understanding that "technology" is an ongo-
ing, dynamic system. Physical tools and materials are the
corporeal representations of technology, but more important for
our purposes are the processes of technology: the science, atti-
tudes, design, and activities that revolve around technological
change. 5
One of the ways in which technological change affects
society, of course, is through its impact on law.16 The extent
to which law is reactionary is debatable, insofar as some ques-
tion whether technology actually spurs a true legal paradigm
shift-the development of completely new legal doctrine, theo-
ry, or regulatory regimes---or simple evolution in existing legal
15 One commentator noted:
In some sense, technology is the quintessential human activity.
Humanity's ability to craft tools is an important aspect of what distin-
guishes us from the cows, pigs, cockroaches, and the rest. We are able to
think, abstract, and use tools to shape our environment. When we talk
about technology in the broadest sense, this is what we are talking
about. In more practical terms, technology is the products, processes,
devices, systems, and networks that we use to help us individually and
collectively pursue our goals and our dreams.
Christopher T. Hill, The Public Dimension of Technological Change: Impact on the
Media, the Citizenry, and Governments-A U.S. Perspective, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 153,
153 (1999).
" See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 1, at 1 (addressing "how legal work can be
done using state-of-the-art technology and whether adjustments must be made in
the legal system to accommodate the changes that technology enables").
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rules to adapt to new factual complexities. 7 The argument
that technology foments revolutionary legal change (so-called
"law-forcing") posits that technology changes the material
nature of our existence, undermining established legal settle-
ments and thereby stimulating changes in the laws that gov-
ern how we live. 8 For example, there were few laws protect-
ing workers until the growth of industrial manufacturing;
indeed, the law did not even reflect an understanding of an
individual laborer as a category needing particular protection.
Similarly, the growth of the telecommunications industry re-
quired an enormous regulatory apparatus that changed the
way in which the state interacted with media. Commentators
now see the same dynamic developing with the growth of the
Internet, which spawns new issues regarding property in
cyberspace and individual privacy rights, and in such techno-
logical advancements as the human genome project or cloning
that might change societal views of personal identity:"9
But the old ways of doing, teaching, and thinking about law are
fundamentally obsolete. Nary a legal doctrine or jurisprudence will
survive intact the present ferment. The information revolution un-
derway will change law as nothing in our experience or understand-
ing has. It took a millennium to develop a sophisticated common law
regime, one based on rights, property, and regulation. It may take
less than a decade for that regime to unravel, as core concepts lose
meaning .... The advent of the Internet has already pressed many
existing rules to the breaking point; more are surely to follow."0
Some argue, though, that technology merely spurs new rules
within an existing legal paradigm.2' Even though technologi-
1? Compare Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (arguing against the idea that the Internet will compel
creation of new law) with Lawrence Lessig, The Law Of The Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 501-03 (1999) (arguing that
Internet technology will create new challenges for legal doctrine).
18 Alan Heinrich et al., At the Crossroads of Law and Technology, 33 LOY. L.A.
L. REv. 1035, 1037 (2000).
" Id. at 1036-41 (discussing various forms of new technologies and their capac-
ity to challenge established legal settlements).
20 Id. at 1036.
", See Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal
Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 976, 1015 (1997) ("Change in technology, even massive change, is not a suffi-
cient reason for changes in judicial doctrine. As we have seen, there is confusion
over which elements of technological change affect which elements of categorical
approach.").
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cal change sometimes requires adjustments in specific regu-
latory laws affecting use of that technology, it does not shake
the basic underpinnings of society. For example, the invention
of the wire tap necessitated laws for its practical use and limi-
tations, but it was still governed within the existing constitu-
tional framework.22 Indeed, Professors Price and Duffy have
argued, in the context of the Supreme Court's modern telecom-
munications jurisprudence, that judges and lawyers use the
excuse of technological change as a subterfuge for "reopening
old legal schisms or reorganizing economic relationships for
reasons only tangentially concerned with technological ad-
vancements."23 When we examine the effects of technological
change on law, then, we have to be mindful of whether we are
talking about a radical, revolutionary shift or simply a shiny
new box containing the same old legal paradigm.24
In examining the nature of a technological change, it is
helpful to create a model for the analysis, breaking the dynam-
ic down and examining four characteristics of technological
change in isolation: (1) the complexity of the technology, (2) the
rate of speed at which it develops, (3) how deeply it penetrates
into the society, and (4) how much it challenges the established
societal and legal analogical status quo. The extent to which a
technology will challenge established legal settlements is based
on a combination of those conditions: a new technology that is
complex, that changes rapidly, that penetrates deep into the
22 As W.G. Sumner noted, in a different context, "stateways cannot change
folkways." W.G. Sumner, Folkways (1907), in John Morison, How to Change Things
with Rules, in STEVEN LIVINGSTONE & JOHN MORISON, LAW, SOCIETY AND CHANGE
5 (1990) (explaining that government is generally responsive to changing social
mores and evolving technologies, not that it is a cause of social change). Curtis E.
A. Karnow, in his book about computer technology and the law, framed the idea
this way:
[T]he problem becomes one of assaying the ability of the legal system to
deal with new issues posed in the realm of human interaction by the
development of technology .... [But] [w]ith respect to some problems
the resolution, if one is at hand, may simply be a matter of applying
existing principles of law to the issue posed by the new technology.
CURTIS E.A. KARNOW, FUTURE CODES: ESSAYS IN ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLO-
GY AND THE LAW 12-13 (1997).
' Price & Duffy, supra note 21, at 980.
24 Of course, law is also sometimes a spur for creating new technology. This is
called "technology-forcing," a situation in which lawyers, such as regulatory agen-
cies, establish standards that cannot be met with current technology. Heinrich et
al., supra note 18, at 1036.
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culture, and that is unique and radical is going to pose the
most difficult problems for law and society.
A. Complexity
In any examination of new technologies, we have to ensure
that we have a full understanding of the technology and its
societal effects. This means not just understanding the techni-
cal specifications of the technology, but also its place in society.
This can pose particular challenges in that much of modern
technology is baffling, especially with regard to computers in
general and the Internet specifically. Most of us understand
the rudimentary workings of, for example, an automobile, even
though we might not be able to diagnose the cause of smoke
coming out of our engines as we sit on the side of the road. But
how the entirety of digital communications can be reduced to a
series of "l's" and "O's" escapes most of us, and even those with
the basic skills to surf the web or even build a web page have
little grasp of the technical intricacies of the machines sitting
on our desks. We need, though, to know such things if we are
to assess the effect of technological change because that exami-
nation greatly depends on our ability to recognize the prop-
erties and limitations of the technology. The more complicated
the technology-and the Internet is an extremely complicated
technology-the more difficult this task.
This issue has particular efficacy when we are discussing
the types of precautions a particular user must take in imple-
menting the new technology.' In making that kind of judg-
ment, we need to understand how people interact with the
technology, what their legal expectations for it are. "[U]ser
understandings and expectations of the capabilities of local
area networks, for example, will directly affect users' beliefs on
the privacy and security of their data, whether a user is truly
anonymous, and so on."26 Again, the more complicated the
technology, the more difficult it is for users to come to consen-
sus about these expectations and the more difficult it is for us
5 As Karnow noted, "The law delights in tests that ask whether a defendant
took 'reasonable precautions' under all the circumstances to ensure something was
done or avoided," a calculation that depends entirely on the "widely different levels
of knowledge about the technology." KARNOW, supra note 22, at 8-9.
26 KARNOW, supra note 22, at 9-11.
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to assess the legal effect.
B. Velocity
This characteristic refers to the need to be aware of the
pace of technological change, which can quickly render estab-
lished legal settlements obsolete, and the evenness of that
change (i.e., whether it evolves in fits and starts or more grad-
ually). A quickly evolving technology is going to pose special
challenges to the legal system, which is inherently bound to a
slow, reactive rhythm. Most of the systemic reaction to a
changing technology will not even involve formal legal actors
such as the legislature or the courts. Rather, most disputes
arising from new technologies will be resolved in private settle-
ments, not public litigations. The formal systemic reaction is
always going to be delayed, given that it takes time for techno-
logical change to give rise to an unresolvable dispute between
parties, requiring public judicial or legislative resolution.8
This is, of course, arguably as it should be, since systemically
we prefer that most disputes result in private settlements and
that legislatures and courts should only get involved as neces-
sary when the concerns have gained sufficient visibility and
universality.29 We do not generally want courts and legisla-
27 KARNOW, supra note 22, at 8 ("Slowly developing technologies, by definition,
have more time to percolate through the culture than do the quick ones. And
when the pace of change is especially fast, segments of the culture will simply not
assimilate.").
28 See Heinrich et al., supra note 18, at 1041 (arguing that "legislative bodies
must confront the very real possibility that their responses to technologically driv-
en challenges will become obsolete upon their enactment"). Some argue, in fact,
that the pace of rapid technological change makes the established judicial proce-
dure-in which appellate courts are forced to rely on factual findings by trial
courts made perhaps years earlier-singularly ill-suited to effectively render legal
settlements. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice:
Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 279
(1999).
29 Professor Goldberg, for example, explains that this lag is inevitable because
of the law's emphasis on process and science's emphasis on progress:
Thus the fundamental difference in values between science and law is
subtle, but important. Science is not a compendium of timelessly true
statements. It is, in a sense, a process for formulating and testing hy-
potheses that are not always open to revision. But in science this process
is a means to an end, and that end is progress in our knowledge of the
world. In law, process is not simply or primarily a means to an end. In
[Vol. 66: 2
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tors rushing in to make decisions that might strangle the new
technology in its crib.30
Since the legal system is always going to be reactive, not
proactive, with regard to technological change, the rate of that
change is going to further complicate matters. A slowly evolv-
ing technology gives time for the legal system to catch up and
perhaps regulate future growth. But a radically fluctuating
technology is constantly going to leave the law behind, rending
established legal settlements. Lawyers trying to advise clients
about how to act within such a radically changing technological
environment find themselves, like Hercules, trying to slay the
nine-headed "Lernaen Hydra," finding that two new heads
grow in place of every one cut off.31 This is especially true if
the technology evolves at an uneven rate-or if some aspects of
the technology change more quickly than others-because that
will make the rate of change even more unpredictable.
C. Penetration
A third characteristic of technological change is how deep-
ly it penetrates into society. The greater the infiltration, the
more seismic the legal impact. Essentially, penetration de-
pends on the cost of using the technology, its convenience, its
ease of use, and its reliability. If a technology is costly or
difficult to use, it will have only marginal impact on a society
and compel very little legal change; but a technology that is
easily accessed, cheap, and useful will obviously penetrate
deeply.33 The Internet, for example, existed for over twenty
years without creating even a blip on our societal radar screen,
an important sense, process is the end.
STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AmERICA 19 (1994).
" See Ira Magaziner, Keynote Address: At the Crossroads of Law and Technolo-
gy, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165 (2000) (arguing for governmental restraint in con-
fronting new technologies).
"' In Greek mythology, one of Hercules' labors was to slay the nine-headed
Lernaen Hydra. Whenever Hercules cut off one of the heads, two new heads grew
back on. Hercules ultimately killed the serpent by burning the neck stumps after
lopping the heads off, not a particularly helpful analogy at this point for legal
assimilation of new technology. Paradigm Busters: Hercules, Alexander, & You, at
http://www.ganesha.org/leading/hercules.html.
32 Wilkins, supra note 1, at 7.
Id. at 5-7 (discussing various technologies).
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resulting in virtually no legal ramifications. This was mainly
because it was cumbersome, slow, and difficult for all but the
truly technically sophisticated to use. But following the inno-
vations related to the creation of the World Wide Web, brows-
ers, high speed connections, and search engines, and the con-
comitant commercial frenzy of the late 1990s, the Internet has
penetrated as deeply as any technological change in genera-
tions. As a result, we have witnessed an explosion of Internet-
related legal issues as society comes to grasp with the
medium's abilities and limitations.34
This dynamic will repeat itself with any new technology.
The extent to which it penetrates into the culture will help
determine if it has any impact on the prevailing legal para-
digm.
D. Uniqueness
A unique technological change is one that does not have an
easy antecedent upon which to base legal doctrine. Unprece-
dented technologies pose greater challenges for legal assimila-
tion because they reduce our ability to predict their societal
effects.
In confronting technological change, especially when it
comes to new communication media, we need to recognize that
our ability to understand the implications of that assimilation
will be limited because of our experience with existing media.
Humans are more comfortable with the recognizable rather
than the strange. Lawyers in particular are always likely to
"fight the last war," to adapt to new media with particular
reference to old media. Part of this inclination is caused by the
cognitive tendency to be over-influenced by the information
that is most easily recalled and salient (the "availability heu-
ristic").35 That is, we adapt to new technologies by relying on
" For example, I conducted two online searches for law review articles that
mentioned the word "Internet" or "Arpanet," the precursor to the Internet, in their
text. My first search was for the terms in any article prior to January 1, 1990. It
turned up 13 documents. My second search was for the terms in any article after
January 1, 1990, which was the year in which browser software was first intro-
duced. See Hricik, supra note 3, at 462-63. The search was stopped at 10,000
documents.
"' See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
[Vol. 66: 2
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reference points provided by older, established technologies
with which we are familiar.3 ' The invention of radio, for ex-
ample, was a staggering technological change, far more unique
than the later invention of television, simply because users of
televisions could think of them as "radios with pictures." Al-
though television has arguably had a more lasting impact on
our society (perhaps because of its penetration), radio posed a
far greater challenge to existing legal paradigm at its inception
simply because there had been nothing like it before. Similarly,
the Internet, for all its glamour, may not have nearly the
uniqueness as the anteceding invention of the personal com-
puter.
The uniqueness of a technological change is even more
problematic for our legal system than for society as a whole,
simply because of the style of analysis in which lawyers en-
gage. Our legal system is predicated on argument by analogy,
training us to search intently for the closest available factual
precedent.37 Analogies are both our strength and our weak-
ness-our strength because of the analogical potential to ren-
der the complex more simple and accessible, but our weakness
because analogies by their nature shear off the rough edges of
dissimilarity and can often place boundaries on our thinking.
Especially when confronting technological change, we can
reach the limitations of analogical usefulness; this happened,
for example, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC," where the Court, in considering
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 705 (1999) (discussing availability heuristic); see
also SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121
(1993) (defining heuristics).
"G Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of .Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1188 (1995) (discussing cognitive biases and "schemas," which are ways peo-
ple can process information).
", KARNOW, supra note 22, at 5 ("this 'reasoning from analogy' to which law-
yers are trained presupposes a lurking metaphor and overarching imagery, shared
assumptions as between the old and new contexts.") As Justice Cardozo once
wrote, "I do not mean that the directive force of history, even when its claims are
most assertive, confines the law of the future to uninspired repetition of the law
of the present and the past. I mean simply that history, in illuminating the past,
illuminates the present, and in illuminating the present, illuminates the future."
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 53 (1921).
38 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (finding that permitting operator to prohibit patently
offensive or indecent programming on leased access channels is consistent with
First Amendment).
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limitations on cable television, forewent analogy as inapposite,
and instead it conducted a fact-intensive review of the technol-
ogy." Indeed, because of the peculiarly accelerated nature of
technological change, analogies can be singularly misleading:
Analogical reasoning plays a profoundly important role whenever a
court must decide the proper legal rules to apply to a new technol-
ogy. Sadly, however, courts usually stumble before they find the
correct analogy for new technologies. The law of copyright has pro-
vided several notorious examples. Piano rolls were not originally
understood to be analogous to sheet music. Software stored in read
only memory was not understood to be the same as software stored
on disk .... When a court fails to use analogical reasoning and
attempts to regulate a new technology without the guidance of histo-
ry, it risks creating bad law. Although such determinations are
almost always eroded over time or reversed later, they may cause
harm in the intervening years."
This is the dynamic we have seen constantly with the Internet,
as lawyers and judges toil endlessly for the proper analogy: is
a web page similar to a newspaper, a town crier, or a radio sta-
tion or is e-mail like a postcard sent through the mails or a
whispered conversation in a crowded room?41 How the analo-
gy plays out often determines the applicable legal standards,
"' The Court did not conduct its traditional forum analysis, and it refused to
categorize the applicable standard of review. See Heinrich et al., supra note 18, at
1045 (reviewing the Denver Area decision and concluding that "[jiurisprudence in
an era of dynamic change may well proceed on an increasingly case-by-case ba-
sis"); Price & Duffy, supra note 21, at 979-980 (discussing how the Denver Area
decision represented ideological preferences).
41 Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet,
the Printing Press, and Freedom of Speech, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 711, 720-21
(1997); see also ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 100 (1983)
('Then the telephone was invented, the question was whether, at law, the tele-
phone was a new kind of telegraph or something different. If the phone was a
telegraph, a body of law already existed that would apply. The decisions some-
times went one way, sometimes the other; but the model of the telegraph was
always there to be considered."); Heinrich et al., supra note 18, at 1045 ("Argu-
ably, judicial decision-making may be challenged at a more radical level in coming
years. Traditional rule-based, categorical reasoning, one of the hallmarks of the
judicial decision-making process, is ill-suited to address areas of dynamic change.").
41 Wallace & Green, supra note 40, at 720. With regard to new media, several
commentators have pointed out the difficulty of defining categories that are intel-
lectually defensible and stable. See Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into
Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 960 (1996) (stating
that "there arises a widespread view that neither the doctrinal categories nor the
substantive content of current First Amendment law are adequate to deal with
emerging problems").
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and our ability to develop appropriate analogical imagery and
form accurate connections between old and new will depend on
technological uniqueness.
E. Conclusion
Technological change creates ambiguity about the applica-
tion of legal rules throughout our society. With our often in-
complete comprehension of technological complexity, tentative,
searching reliance on analogies, and our inability to judge the
speed at which technology might change or penetrate into
society, we are often in a state of flux, uncertain how to adapt
to the changes. Having established principles of technological
change, the next question becomes whether these difficulties
have affected the legal response to the challenges posed by e-
mail for the attorney-client privilege.
II. E-MAIL AND THE No-ENCRYPTION CONSENSUS
A bit surprisingly, lawyers have rushed to adopt the
Internet as a communications media. Usually, with new tech-
nologies, there is a feeling-out period in which professionals,
particularly non-technologically-oriented lawyers, will take a
wait-and-see approach.42 But the Internet has been a phenom-
enon, and lawyers, like everyone else, have been seduced by its
ease, convenience, and universal access.43 Lawyers can now
share and retrieve information with an ease not possible even
five years ago; indeed, one recent survey found that every law
firm contacted provided Internet access to lawyers at their own
desks and that each of the firms used e-mail for business purposes.44
2 See Paul Bernstein, Bulletin-Board Systems Hold Accessible Pools of Infor-
mation, NA'L L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 15 (pointing out that law firms have tradi-
tionally been behind the cutting-edge on technological issues).
' Indeed, some lawyers are forced to use the Internet by the clients whose
confidences they are concerned with protecting. In one article, a lawyer was quoted
as saying, "Sometimes we have to remind [clients] of the risks and suggest some-
thing be mailed or done on the phone to avoid a written record." Emily Tipping,
Internet and E-Mail Are Viewed as Indispensable Tools for Law Firms, PITT. BUS.
TIMES & J., June 2, 2000, at 36.
"' Id. at 36 (reporting a survey of law firms conducted by the Financial Print-
ers Network, a worldwide alliance of independent financial printers). One article
cited an ABA small firm technology survey indicating that, even in 1997, almost
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This Section examines how e-mail came to be generally
accepted as a safe communication medium for lawyers. In
determining what standards we should apply to protecting the
attorney-client privilege for documents transmitted over the
Internet, we need to examine the development of the no-en-
cryption consensus for e-mail. Specifically, a review of that
debate over the past five years shows that there was a rush to
judgment on e-mail confidentiality that resulted in a virtual
sanctification of the medium by the ABA, state ethics boards,
and the few commentators who reviewed the subject in law
review articles and notes. Without case law, virtual unanimity
developed that attorneys can use unencrypted e-mail without
waiving their client's confidences based on a misunderstanding
of e-mail and technological change.
This Section reviews how this orthodoxy for e-mail devel-
oped, arguing that lawyers should avoid relying on the same
flawed standard for developing Internet information technolo-
gies.
A. E-mail and Encryption Defined
The word "e-mail" can be broadly defined as a message
sent over a computer network that usually includes text but
can also enclose by means of attachment any sound, video, or
text file.45 E-mail is by far the most popular Internet applica-
tion. Indeed, Forrester Research estimated in early 2000 that
within two years, American users will send over 1.5 billion e-
mail messages per day.4" The appeal for lawyers is obvious
because e-mail provides near-instantaneous communication for
lawyers working in distant locations and an ability to share
and exchange documents with relative ease.
two-thirds of small firms responding reported using the Internet. Mitchel L.
Winick et al., Playing I Spy with Client Confidences: Confidentiality, Privilege and
Electronic Communications, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1225, 1243 (2000) (relying on
ABA, Legal Technology Resources Center, 1997 Small Firm Technology Survey
(1997)).
"' "E-mail" is defined as "the exchange of computer-stored messages by telecom-
munication." Whatis.com?, at http'//www.whatis.com.
46 Bob Tedeschi, Wary of Hackers and Courts, E-Mail Users are Turning to
Services that Keep Their Messages Secure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at Cl (cit-
ing estimates by Forrester Research, Inc.).
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Understanding security issues concerning e-mail requires
knowing a little about how e-mail works. Some e-mail, solely
internal, is sent within private networks such as a law firm's
local area network ("LAN") or "intranet,"47 or over "closed"
public proprietary networks such as America Online or
Earthlink." However, for the purposes of this Article, I will
discuss "external" e-mail, or e-mail sent via the Internet. In
these instances, the e-mail travels from the sender's computer
through the networked internal e-mail server to external serv-
ers on the Internet.4" The e-mail does not go directly from the
sender's to the receiver's host server. Rather, once it leaves the
host server, it is transmitted between networks that are con-
nected to one another through a series of access points or
"gateways."" Each network forwards the e-mail through a
"router," a device that analyzes the transmission, examines the
various network points to which it could send the message
next, and sends the message on the most efficient path based
on its understanding of the state of the networks to which it is
connected. In this process, the e-mail might go through up to a
dozen separate routers on its way to its destination server, and
it might be stored for a brief time on an intermediate server
"' An intranet is defined as "a private network that is contained within an
enterprise" used to "share company information and computing resources among
employees." A local area network or "LAN" is defined as "a group of computers
and associated devices that share a common communications line and typically
share the resources of a single processor or server within a small geographic area
(for example, within an office building)." Whatis.com?, at
http:/www.whatis.techtarget.com/WhatIs DefinitionPage.html (last visited Feb. 13,
2001).
" Generally speaking, an e-mail sent internally or between two members of
the same proprietary service (e.g., two America Online members) does not have
the same security concerns as an Internet e-mail. See Winick et al., supra note 44,
at 1246 (stating that closed systems present "virtually no" confidentiality issues).
Although an internal or proprietary network's e-mail system might be compromised
by outsiders, and although there might be confidentiality issues that are raised by
the ability of systems administrators to review confidential e-mail, those issues are
outside the scope of this Article. See Lou Parker & Dave Gardner, Using the
Internet-Ethical, Privileged, or Malpractice?, 8 NEVAnA LAW., June 2000, at 20
(discussing ways of protecting e-mail through dedicated lines, firewalls, and virtual
private networks).
" To some extent, I simplify the explanation of the process here. For more
technical descriptions of e-mail technology, see Hricik, supra note 3, at 463-64;
Masur, supra note 3, at 1141.
" Indeed, this interconnection of networks makes up what we think of as "the
Internet."
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
while the router chooses a path for the next leg of its journey.
During this time, the e-mail might also be broken down into
chunks of information, or "packets," that might take different
routes and get reassembled at the end of the journey.
These two features of the Internet--"dynamic routing" and
packetization-are two of its defining characteristics, remnants
of its inherently decentralized construction, which provides
various redundant paths from one point to the other, originally
designed to ensure that the physical destruction of any one set
of servers would not cripple the system and prevent messages
from getting through.51 Indeed, these concepts have led some
to believe that an e-mail journey's resulting randomness is its
greatest protection because potential interceptors cannot pre-
dict with certainty the route a particular e-mail will take.52
There are numerous ways, though, in which an e-mail can
still go astray. The most obvious, of course, is through simple
human error: mis-addressing the communication. For example,
one lawyer received an e-mail from a client attaching what she
thought was the final draft of a document. She made com-
ments on the draft and then replied to the distribution list for
the original e-mail. Unfortunately, she had misunderstood the
communication, which was actually the final draft of the docu-
ment being distributed to both sides of the transaction, and
she unwittingly communicated her thoughts to opposing coun-
sel.53
An e-mail might also be subject to interception, either
while being stored or being sent. An intruder could, for exam-
ple, unauthorizedly access e-mail being stored on an insecure
system, just as a hacker could compromise any improperly
secured computer data. Also, the staff at an e-mail provider's
ISP or internal network administrators have physical access to
5 This aspect of the Internet derives from its origins as a Department of De-
fense project known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (the
"Arpanet"), which was designed to be an interlink of governmental academic net-
works protected from destruction by its redundant routing capabilities. See KATIE
HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
INTERNET 71-73 (1996); Hricik, supra note 3, at 462-63 (describing the development
of Arpanet and the eventual commercial development of the Internet).
52 ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at § C.4; Hricik, supra note 3, at 468-69.
This story, apparently true, was recounted in an article in the New York
Law Journal. See Rose Auslander, Keeping Sensitive Information Private, N.Y.L.J.,
June 8, 1999, at 5.
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transmissions between their LAN's and other Internet nodes,
so they always have the ability to read or review any e-mail
passing through their networks. Users can protect themselves
from those types of security problems, though, by shoring up
their own internal network protections.
E-mail is most vulnerable while it is traveling from net-
work to network over the Internet. There are two particular
methods of gaining unauthorized access to e-mails. The first is
"sniffing"-using software to intercept an e-mail traveling
through a network on its way to its destination by capturing it
at a particular router on its path.54 The router is programmed
not just to read the e-mail for its destination address, but to
look for information contained within; the router can also be
programmed to look only for certain types of data or only for
transmissions coming from or intended for particular ma-
chines.55 Sniffers are normally benign tools used by network
administrators to maintain their systems," but they can also
be put to unauthorized purposes. Reportedly, for example,
some hackers set up a "sniffer" on an Internet node or router
on the main New York to Washington routing hub to search
for the word "merger," trying to access potentially confidential
communications. 7 Another method of intercepting e-mail is
through a "spoofer," a computer configured to waylay messages
meant for a particular user by emulating the user's comput-
er.5" In spoofing, the hacker programs a computer on the net-
work to impersonate the intended recipient's computer, thereby
snaring the recipient's messages in transit. The spoofer might
also even send back a message to the original sender, making
"' Sniffer programs are easily downloadable off the Internet. For example,
inputting "sniffer" into a major search engine revealed a program that would do
all of the following: "Listen to all TCP/IP traffic on a subnet; Intercept all outgo-
ing requests for Web documents and display them; Intercept all incoming requests
for Web documents and display them; [and] Decode the Basic authentication pass-
words, if any." Example Web Packet Sniffer, at
http://stein.cshl.org/-lstein/talks/WWW6/sniffer. The author apparently wrote the
program to "show how vulnerable the Web is to sniffing." Id.
s Millington, Decoding E-mail Encryption, COLO. LAW., Mar. 1998, at 78.
= Masur, supra note 3, at 1155. Masur tells a story of how he once set up a
sniffer to capture all the network traffic on a client's internal network, resulting
in him discovering the company president's e-mail password. Masur, supra note 3,
at 1155.
s, Masur, supra note 3, at 1155.
s Masur, supra note 3, at 1154; see also Hricik, supra note 3, at 497.
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it seem as if the e-mail was properly delivered.59
A user can protect e-mail from interception, though, in
several ways. In addition to keeping e-mail from entering the
Internet through the use of dedicated lines or internal net-
works-which would not be feasible for lawyers needing to
communicate with someone through the Internet-users can
take advantage of encryption technology. Encryption encodes
and scrambles a message by translating it according to a secret
mathematical formula (the "key"), rendering it unintelligible to
anyone who does not know that formula." For some encryp-
tion mechanisms, known as symmetrical key encryption,61 the
same secret key is used for both encryption and decryption;
that is, the sender encrypts her message using a particular
formula, and the recipient decodes the message using that
same key.62 The problem with single-key encryption is that
both sides need possession of the key, which leads to the logis-
tical difficulties of getting the same key to both sender and re-
cipient without making the key itself vulnerable to interception
by distributing it too widely, which would undermine the
whole purpose of having only one key. 3
" Hricik, supra note 3, at 499.
60 RSA Labs defines the term as follows: "Encryption is the transformation of
data into a form that is as close to impossible as possible to read without the
appropriate knowledge . . . . Its purpose is to ensure privacy by keeping informa-
tion hidden from anyone for whom it is not intended . . . ." What is Public Key
Cryptography, at http//www.rsasecurit,.com/rsalabs/faq/1-2.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2001).
6 This type of encryption is also described as "private key" or "single key"
encryption. Id.
62 Id. For a thorough, accessible description of encryption, see JERRY LAWSON,
THE COMPLETE INTERNET HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 226-33 (1999) (discussing pri-
vate- and public-key encryption and recommending some form of encryption securi-
ty for e-mail); see also Masur, supra note 3, at 1134 (describing public- and pri-
vate-key encryption).
RSA Labs describes the problem as follows:
The main challenge is getting the sender and receiver to agree on the
secret key without anyone else finding out. If they are in separate physi-
cal locations, they must trust a courier, a phone system, or some other
transmission medium to prevent the disclosure of the secret key. Anyone
who overhears or intercepts the key in transit can later read, modify,
and forge all messages encrypted or authenticated using that key. The
generation, transmission and storage of keys is called key management.
What is Public Key Cryptography?, at http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq/2-1-
1.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
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Public-key encryption solves these logistical problems by
giving each user a pair of keys-one public and one pri-
vate-that are linked so that information encrypted with the
public key can only be decrypted by the private key.' The
public key associated with a particular user is published or
otherwise made publically available on some trusted third
party certification authority; meanwhile, the private key is
kept secret. To take advantage of public-key encryption, a
sender (or, more likely, the sender's e-mail software) deter-
mines what her recipient's public key is, then encrypts the
message through that public key. The e-mail, as it wends its
way through the Internet, is encrypted and unintelligible.65
When the user receives it, though, he can decrypt it using the
private key associated with the public one.
Used correctly, encryption is a virtually ironclad guarantor
of e-mail security.66 Traditionally, though, encryption software
has been awkward or difficult to use, and managing the vari-
ous public and private keys associated with each user is a
significant burden on attorneys and support staff.6" The ques-
tion of whether attorneys using e-mail for confidential informa-
tion should encrypt their e-mail to take advantage of that iron-
clad security has been the subject of active debate for the past
five years.
" LAWSON, supra note 62, at 227-29 (describing fundamental public- and pri-
vate-key issues); Masur, supra note 3, at 1134; Millington, supra note 55, at 73.
" What is Public Key Cryptography?, at http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq/2-
1-1.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001); Lou Parker & Dave Gardner, Using the
Internet-Ethical, Privileged, or Malpractice?, 8 NEVADA LAW., June 2000, at 20.
" LAWSON, supra note 62, at 230 (stating that while encryption is not fool-
proof, it does provide the best security available); accord, Masur, supra note 3, at
1135-36. Some critics argue that encryption is not perfect. In one article, for exam-
ple, a lawyer argued that encryption was not only awkward and expensive but
also that it does not generally protect the identities of the sender or recipients,
meaning that a sniffer could still single out messages by particular individuals.
Hricik, supra note 3, at 494-95. Even Lawson, a proponent of encryption, notes
that any system is "breakable." LAWSON, supra note 62, at 230.
7 Auslander, supra note 53, at 5 (stating that "encryption is awkward enough
that most firms do not use it .... The expense and difficulty would be multi-
plied where a law firm has several different clients who prefer several different
forms of encryption").
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B. The Consensus on E-mail Encryption
Formal recognition of the security issues related to wheth-
er using e-mail for privileged correspondence waived the privi-
lege started developing in 1995 to 1996 in a series of state bar
ethics opinions and law review or bar journal commentaries."8
While the early signals were very cautious, later decisions,
including an authoritative statement by the ABA, declared e-
mail a safe medium for attorney-client correspondence.
The early opinions about e-mail usage by attorneys took
relatively severe views. The strictest came in 1995, when the
South Carolina State Ethics Board stated that an attorney
could not use the Internet for client correspondence because of
the presence of system operators who would have access to the
communications.69 This was a particularly extreme opinion,
effectively barring the Internet as a communications medium
because any network system is going to require a technical
operator (who is almost certainly not going to be a lawyer
" According to an online database search, the first law review commentary on
the issue was published in November 1996. See William P. Matthews, Encoded
Confidences: Electronic Mail, The Internet, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 273 (1996) (arguing that American legislatures and courts should
recognize an expectation of privacy in electronic mail sufficient to sustain the
attorney-client privilege). There were also some non-law review commentaries that
came out during this time. See, e.g., Ron Smith, Lawyers Must Overcome
Technophobia, Learn to Take Advantage of E-mail, Net, 65 KAN. B. J. 3 (1996)
(arguing for use of Internet and e-mail by lawyers); Charles R. Merrill, E-mail for
Attorneys From A to Z, Practicing Law Institute, PLI Order No. G7-4697, at 187
(December 1996) (pointing out dangers of unencrypted e-mail); Peter R. Jarvis &
Bradley F. Tellam, The Internet: New Dangers of Ethics Traps, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
Dec. 1995, at 7, 17 (arguing that e-mail service from reputable providers would
protect privilege); Todd Flaming, An Introduction to the Internet, 83 ILL. B.J., 311,
311 (1995) (discussing e-mail use by attorneys).
" S.C. Bar, Advisory Op. 94-27 (1995) ("[Tlhe very nature of on-line services is
such that the system operators of the on-line service may gain access to all com-
munications that occur on the on-line service. Thus, the confidentiality require-
ments of Rule 1.6 are implicated by any confidential communication which occurs
across electronic media, absent an express waiver by the client."). The opinion
developed from a question concerning advertising online and using electronic bulle-
tin boards. So it is possible that the board's opinion was not particularly centered
on the issue of e-mail itself. Even those who argue that e-mail is not a particular-
ly safe medium acknowledge that system operator access to e-mail is no different
from, say, entrusting a confidential package to a Federal Express delivery person.
See Robert A. Pikowsky, Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Commu-
nication Via E-Mail, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 483, 562 (1999) (asserting that operator
access does not violate confidentiality).
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within the confidential relationship). Other ethics boards in
Iowa and Arizona took more cautious views, requiring or sug-
gesting encryption protections in order for attorneys to send
confidential or sensitive material over the Internet via e-
mail.7 °
The momentum shifted in 1997, when both Iowa and
South Carolina reconsidered their previous decisions and other
states leaped in to declare e-mail a secure medium. The Iowa
board amended its opinion, eliminating the encryption require-
ment and asking only that the lawyer and client should agree
as to the means of adequate protection of e-mail correspon-
dence.7 The South Carolina ethics board reversed itself, part-
ly on the ground that "use of e-mail has become commonplace,
and there now exists a reasonable level of 'certainty' and ex-
pectation that such communications may be regarded as confi-
dential."72 The board indicated that there had been changes in
technology that had made e-mail more safe, but did not identi-
fy what those technological advancements had been.73
Soon, a number of state ethics boards weighed in with
opinions that e-mail was no less safe than other communica-
tions media such as facsimile machines or telephones. One of
the most influential was from the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion, which in May 1997 explicitly disagreed with the initial
Iowa and Arizona positions, finding that Internet e-mail was
no less safe than traditional telephone calls.74 The board justi-
"' Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Profl Ethics and Conduct Op. 96-01 (1996) ("[Clounsel
must have written acknowledgment by client of the risk of violation of DR 4-101
which acknowledgment includes consent for communication thereof on the Internet
or non-secure Intranet or other forms of proprietary networks, or it must be en-
crypted or protected by password/firewall or other generally accepted equivalent
security system."); Ariz. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct,
Op. 97-04 (1997) ("E-mail should not be considered a 'sealed' mode of communica-
tion.").
71 Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Profl Ethics and Conduct, Op. 97-01 (1997) (amending
opinion to omit requirement of encryption).
72 S.C. Bar, Ethics Advisory Comm., Op 97.08 (1997). The opinion went on to
say that "[wihile there exists a potential for communications to be intercepted,
albeit illegally, from a commercial network mailbox or an Internet "router," the
Committee does not believe such a potential makes an expectation of privacy un-
reasonable. The same potential exists for the illegal interception of regular mail,
the interception of a facsimile, and the unauthorized wiretapping of land-based
telephone." Id.
"' Masur, supra note 3, at 1125 (criticizing lack of technical analysis of e-mail
in board opinions); accord, Auslander, supra note 53, at 5.
" Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Profl Responsibility, Advisory Op. 96-10
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fled its decision on its understanding of both the technology
and the law. First, the board asserted that the technology of e-
mail made interception as difficult as wiretapping phone calls,
particularly because of packetization and the transmission over
phone lines rather than over the open air waves.75 Second, the
board speculated that e-mail users had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because intercepting an Internet transmission
would be a clear violation of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (the "ECPA").76 The board, in fact, flatly
rejected the idea that it was necessary to discuss the possibili-
ty of encryption with clients to make sure they did not prefer
to use encryption technology.77
The Illinois opinion presaged the developments in the
state ethics boards, and it was followed and often cited by deci-
sions in Alaska, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee.7" Two state boards
within the Second Circuit, Vermont and New York, adopted a
similar rule.7" The New York State Bar Committee on Profes-
(1997).
75 Id.
7' Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1996) ("No otherwise privileged wire, oral,
or electronic communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the
provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.").
77 Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Profl Responsibility, Advisory Op. 96-10
(1997) ("Nor is it necessary, as some commentators have suggested, to seek specific
client consent to the use of unencrypted e-mail. The Committee recognizes that
there may be unusual circumstances involving an extraordinarily sensitive matter
that might require enhanced security measures like encryption. These situations
would, however, be of the nature that ordinary telephones and other normal
means of communication would also be deemed inadequate.").
78 See Ala. Bar Ass'n Ethics, Op. 98-2 (1998) (holding that lawyers need not
encrypt e-mail to ensure confidentiality); D.C. Bar Op. No. 281 (1998) (stating that
transmitting confidential information via e-mail does not per se violate confidenti-
ality); Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Advisory Op. E-403 (1998) (holding that absent
"unusual circumstances" lawyers may use e-mail, including unencrypted Internet e-
mail, to communicate with clients); N.D. State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 97-09
(1997) (stating that lawyers need not use encryption for routine e-mail); Pa. Bar
Assoc. Comm. on Legal Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 97-130 (1997)
("[El-mail does not appear to differ materially from current means of communica-
tion employed by lawyers to the extent that a new set of rules is required, or
such that its use should be discouraged."); Bd. Profl Responsibility Sup. Ct. Tenn.,
Adv. Ethics Op. 98-650(a) (1997) (permitting the use of Internet e-mail because
"the technology involved in e-mail is now better understood and the use of e-mail
more widespread").
71 See N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Committee on Profl Ethics, Op. 709 (1997); Vt. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Profl Responsibility, Advisory Op. 97.5 (1997) ("Since [the] possi-
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sional Ethics, for example, determined that encryption was not
necessary on the grounds that (1) the "criminalization of un-
authorized interception of e-mail certainly enhances the rea-
sonableness of an expectation that e-mails will be as private as
other forms of telecommunication""0 and (2) "the developing
experience from the increasingly widespread use of Internet e-
mail persuades us that concerns over lack of privacy in the use
of Internet e-mail are not currently well founded.""' Similarly,
the New York State legislature in 1997 adopted a statute en-
suring that electronic communications did not lose their privi-
leged character solely because of their electronic transmis-
82sion.
By 1999, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility (the "Committee") endorsed the use
of e-mail by attorneys, stating that a "lawyer may transmit
information relating to the representation of a client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet... because the
mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy from a technological and legal standpoint."8 ' The Commit-
tee further opined that the "same privacy accorded U.S. and
commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions, and fac-
similes applies to Internet e-mail. "" The Committee did issue
the disclaimer that the decision was based on the technology at
the time, although it did not identify the particular technologi-
cal limitations or qualities upon which the decision was based
and that might change.85
bility of interception also exists for fax transmission and regular mail, no reason
exists to treat e-mail differently.").
"' N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Committee on Profl Ethics, Op. 709. The board did note,
though, that a "lawyer who uses Internet e-mail must also stay abreast of this
evolving technology to assess any changes in the likelihood of interception as well
as the availability of improved technologies that may reduce such risks at reason-
able cost." Id.
81Id.
82 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney 1999) ("No communication privileged un-
der this Article shall lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is
communicated by electronic means or because persons necessary for the delivery or
facilitation of such electronic communication may have access to the content of the
communication."); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (Deering 1999) (stating that
otherwise protected communications will not lack confidentiality "solely because the
communication is transmitted by facsimile, cellular telephone, or other electronic
means between the client and his or her lawyer").
ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at Intro.
84 ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at Intro.
ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at Intro.; see also Julie Brienza, No Encryption
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The ABA's opinion was widely anticipated by the legal
community, which was balky at the concept of having to
encrypt all client e-mail, and which applauded the decision as
a ratification of what by that time was common practice. As a
reporter for the New York Law Journal stated, the "sigh of
relief' that greeted the opinion from lawyers who had been
using e-mail without encryption was "almost audible."' Simi-
larly, what academic or professional commentary there was on
the issue generally agreed with the consensus that e-mail was
safe enough for attorney-client transmissions and that encryp-
tion should not be necessary. David Hricik, whose revealingly-
titled article, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting
Client Confidences by Internet E-mail, was cited by the ABA in
its opinion, summed up the prevailing mood:
The problem with arguments being made to demonstrate that the
Internet is not secure is, when applied to existing modes of commu-
nication, even the most highly-regarded and most secure means of
communication cannot be used without warnings, encryption, or
both. Common sense seems to have lost its place in the debate ....
Risk of interception subsists in every communication system, such
as the telephone and the postal system. Some things should never
be written; some things should never be mailed; some things should
never be transmitted over the Internet without encryption. However,
a bright-line requirement of encryption is unwarranted.87
Hricik's conclusions were generally repeated in other commen-
tary in the three years preceding the ABA opinion, most of
which either advocated a no-encryption standard or cautiously
recommended encryption as a good idea for particularly sensi-
tive documents.8" While some of those arguments left open
Required for Attorney-Client E-Mail, TRIAL, July 1999, at 112 (reporting on ABA
opinion, supra note 5, stating that it urges attorneys to take a common-sense
approach to protecting the privilege).
86 Wendy R. Leibowitz, Why E-Mail Encryption May Be Necessary, N.Y.L.J.,
May 11, 1999, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
Hricik, supra note 3, at 507.
See Martha Harris, E-Mail Privacy: An Oxymoron?, 78 NEB. L. REv. 386,
410 (1999) (stating that "use of unencrypted e-mail between attorney and client
should not, in and of itself, result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege");
Amy M. Fulmer Stevenson, Comment, Making a Wrong Turn on the Information
Superhighway: Electronic Mail, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Inadvertent Dis-
closure, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 347, 356 (1997) (tentatively calling encryption 'worth
the effort"); Harry M. Gruber, Note, E-Mail: The Attorney-Client Privilege Applied,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 624, 655-56 (1998) (arguing for "some type of security
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the possibility that encryption technology could improve to the
point of making it a more feasible requirement, only a few
recommended encryption.89
C. Evaluating The No-Encryption Standard: E-mail as
Technological Change
This final Section of Part II examines the no-encryption
consensus and shows how it relies on a fundamental misunder-
standing of the technologies involved. In particular, the ABA
and other decision-makers understood too little the complexity
and pace of technological change and misjudged the relative
penetration of e-mail and encryption technologies. Perhaps as
a result, the analogies drawn between e-mail and established
technologies did not account for the uniqueness of e-mail as a
technological change, resulting in a standard that does not
reflect the inherent insecurity of e-mail and the importance of
the available remedy in encryption.
mechanism" to support precautions but not advocating encryption requirement);
Jonathan Rose, Note, E-Mail Security Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 179, 206 (1997) (arguing for en-
cryption for all confidential information but saying that it may not be feasible).
Even commentaries in the last few years accept unflinchingly the idea that en-
cryption is too expensive or difficult to require for Internet transmission of e-mail.
See Christopher C. Miller, Note, For Your Eyes Only? The Real Consequences of
Unencrypted E-mail in Attorney-Client Communication, 80 B.U. L. REV. 613, 631-32
(2000) (arguing that encryption "should not be required" because "e-mail provides
an efficient, fast and cost-effective means of communication").
89 R. Scott Simon, Searching for Confidentiality in Cyberspace: Responsible Use
of E-Mail for Attorney-Client Communications, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 527, 571 (1998)
(arguing that the responsible attorney should take precautions such as encryption
when using e-mail); Masur, supra note 3, at 1159 (same). One recent commentator
did not take a firm position on encryption but clearly warned attorneys to take a
cautious approach to using e-mail for confidential client information. See Winick et
al., supra note 44, at 1257 (concluding that attorneys should read into the ABA
Opinion, supra note 5, that reasonable care requires an affirmative duty to evalu-
ate appropriateness of e-mail for a particular communication). Similarly, Jerry
Lawson, author of THE COMPLETE INTERNET HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, recommends
that although the Internet is "probably secure enough" for most e-mail messages,
lawyers should adopt encryption technology as it becomes easier to implement.
LAWSON, supra note 62, at 237.
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1. Complexity: Misunderstanding E-mail Technology
The main weakness in the no-encryption consensus is the
lack of technological awareness the ABA and some ethics
boards demonstrated, particularly concerning the difficulties in
intercepting e-mail messages. One commentator called the
debate "little more than an incestuous game of tele-
phone"--inadequate or incomplete descriptions of technological
concepts such as packetization and dynamic routing by lawyers
in bar journals and law reviews morphed into keystones of
ethics boards and ABA opinions that e-mail was an inherently
secure medium."0
The technological foundation of the ABA's opinion that e-
mail was safe was the understanding that dynamic routing
and packetization ensured that intercepting an e-mail would
be difficult, if not impossible.9 The interceptor, according to
the ABA, would not be able to predict with any real accuracy
the path that an e-mail would take (because of dynamic rout-
ing) and would likely only get part of the message even if she
succeeded (because of packetization).92 Indeed, the ABA de-
scribed routing not as dynamic but as "random," indicating a
belief that routing patterns were impossible, not difficult, to
predict. The ABA never undertook its own examination into
the nature of the technology, instead relying on articles written
by lawyers, not by technologists, for their technical under-
standings.
The ABA was not necessarily wrong in these conclusions,
but it was perhaps a bit too overconfident that the technologi-
Masur, supra note 3, at 1122.
" The ABA relied in part on the article by David Hricik, a lawyer, in the
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, in which Hricik identified the state of e-mail
technology at the time (1998) and particularly discussed how routing and
packetization made e-mail interception improbable. Hricik, supra note 3, at 466-67,
498; see also Rose, supra note 88, at 23 (discussing routing). The earliest articula-
tion of this argument was found in a 1996 article written by a practitioner. See G.
Burgess Allison, Technology Update, LAW. PRAC. MGMT., Apr. 1996, at 16, 18.
92 ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at § C.4 ("[Diuring the passage of Internet e-
mail between sender and recipient, the message ordinarily is split into fragments
or 'packets' of information. Therefore, only parts of individual messages customari-
ly pass through ISPs, limiting the extent of any potential disclosure. Because the
specific route taken by each e-mail message through the labyrinth of phone lines
and ISPs is random, it would be very difficult consistently to intercept more than
a segment of a message by the same author.")
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cal limitations of the Internet made interception as difficult as
it believed. As one commentator with experience working as an
Internet systems administrator found in an informal experi-
ment, whatever "randomness" there was in dynamic routing
and packetization has diminished considerably as the Internet
infrastructure has developed.93 From September to October,
1999, Masur, at the time a student at Columbia University,
sent six different e-mail messages between his home computer
and three remote computers and found little variety in the
paths the messages took through the Internet, much less vari-
ety than would be sufficient to provide security.94
The technological foundation for the ABA's opinion, and
the consensus that e-mail is safe enough, then, is questionably
predicated on the state of the art circa 1998 or earlier, when
the Internet infrastructure was not nearly as developed as
subsequent commercial incentives have spurred.95 As the
Internet becomes more standardized and reliable, e-mail that
might at one point have traveled a random, circuitous route to
its destination might now take predictable, well-worn, and
more easily monitored paths.
Moreover, the ABA's consensus was also grounded legally
on the belief that sufficient protections for e-mail security are
provided by the criminalization of interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications by the ECPA, and the statutory
provision that otherwise privileged communications do not lose
their privilege solely from interception." There is little doubt
that the ECPA criminalizes the interception of an electronic
mail message while in transit, but the extent to which the
ECPA protects the privilege of e-mail communications, or
Masur, supra note 3, at 1147-48.
" Masur found that half the routers traversed by the packets were identical
and that packets sent within twenty-four hours showed minor or nonexistent vari-
ance. Masur, supra note 3, at 1147-48.
"' Moreover, both the ABA and the influential Illinois state ethics board might
have mis-conceived the nature of packetization, which does not necessarily break
the e-mail into unrecognizable or unintelligible parts; indeed, packetization often
simply makes duplicates of the e-mail, increasing the security risk by sending
multiple copies of the privileged document through various routers.
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21, 2701-11 (1996). The belief that the ECPA protects e-
mail, thus vitiating security concerns, originated, apparently, with Albert Gidari.
See Albert Gidari, Privilege and Confidentiality in Cyberspace, COMPUTER LAW.,
Feb. 1996, at 1-3.
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makes e-mail use reasonable, is questionable. First, there is
some debate as to whether accessing an e-mail that is stored
on a server awaiting delivery, rather than an e-mail in transit,
would be a violation of the ECPA.97 To date, the only case
considering the issue found that e-mail on a server was not
protected by the ECPA.9 Thus, certain types of interception
may not be covered. Second, the ECPA may only protect
against interception from certain types of networks that pro-
vide wire or electronic communications services, rather than
networks, for example, set up by universities or other entities
that do not, strictly speaking, provide public services.9 Thus,
the ECPA's coverage of an e-mail transmission may be uneven,
protecting against interception for some legs of the journey but
not for others.
Finally, regardless of the ECPA's coverage, the existence of
criminal penalties for those who would intercept private com-
munications does not absolve attorneys from the obligation to
protect their confidentiality. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) provides that
otherwise privileged communications do not lose their privilege
solely because of interception,"' but that does not preclude
an inquiry into the seriousness with which an attorney protect-
ed the privilege from interception. If a lawyer knows that he is
" See, e.g., Harris, supra note 88, at 398 (explaining why the ECPA may not
protect Internet transmissions because the statute only covers messages in transit,
not stored messages); cf., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding archived voice-mail covered by the Stored Communications Act,
differentiating voice-mail from e-mail, covered by the ECPA).
"8 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the seizure of a computer used to operate an electronic
bulletin board containing unretrieved private electronic mail stored on the bulletin
board did not constitute an unlawful intercept under the ECPA); see also United
States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that turning on a pager
to retrieve numbers on the page did not violate the ECPA).
"' See Harris, supra note 88, at 399 (pointing out that "messages passed
through the systems of organizations which are at best only incidentally 'providers'
of electronic communications services (for example, universities and large corpora-
tions) may not be protected"); Masur, supra note 3, at 1141 (asserting that the
electronic services provider provisions of the ECPA may only apply to entities that
provide services to the public). A court within the Second Circuit, for example,
ruled that the ECPA did not cover a corporation that used fax machines and com-
puters as part of its business but did not sell those services to the public. State
Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Fin. Serv., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 137, 144-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
1"0 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4).
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communicating with his client over a compromised medium, he
cannot argue that his conversation is privileged simply because
the interceptor might be violating the law.1"' In any event,
attorneys have more than a duty to simply avoid the evidentia-
ry implications of waiver of privilege; the exposure of private,
confidential information about a client poses immense risks to
both client and attorney, and there is an independent ethical
obligation to do what is necessary to prevent exposure." 2
2. Velocity and Penetration: The Uneven Development of
E-mail and Encryption Technology
The belief that encryption was not necessary for attorney-
client communications through e-mail developed at a time
when e-mail was easy to use, but encryption was cumbersome
and expensive. The two technologies had not developed at the
same rate of speed, resulting in commercial applications of e-
mail that far outpaced available encryption methods. With
encryption not being a feasible, or at least convenient, method
of protecting e-mail from interception, the ABA and state eth-
ics boards undoubtedly felt pressure to endorse unencrypted e-
mail to both allow lawyers to take advantage of the useful e-
mail technology and normalize what was already going on.
Two characteristics of technological change, velocity and
penetration, are both implicated by the disparity between the
development of e-mail and encryption technologies. Where two
related technologies develop at an uneven rate, one resultantly
achieving far greater penetration than the other, it makes
sense that applicable rules for each would also develop at dif-
ferent rates. A judicial or legislative response to a technology
can only occur if that technology achieves sufficient penetra-
tion that merits such a response, and even then the response
'o, As Wigmore said:
All involuntary disclosures, in particular, through the loss or theft of
documents from the attorney's possession, are not protected by the privi-
lege on the principle that, since the law has granted secrecy so far as its
own process goes, it leaves it to the client and attorney to take measures
of caution sufficient to prevent being overheard by third persons. The
risk of insufficient precautions is upon the client.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2325, at 633 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
"C2 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 4-101(A), (B) (identifying duty
of lawyers to protect client-related information).
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will lag behind. Requiring encryption for attorney-client e-mail
in 1998 or 1999 might have seemed an undue burden and an
unnecessary expense for practitioners, considering how under-
developed encryption technology was at the time.
There are also practical implications of the ABA's decision
to consider. First, the ABA and state ethics boards are not
composed of technologists; rather, they consist, for the most
part, of practicing attorneys who live and work in their com-
munities. Not only are they likely to misunderstand the nature
of the technology, but they also have overriding incentives to
draw inferences in favor of allowing the use of such a conve-
nient new technology, especially where there were sufficient
indications that e-mail was safe enough. Indeed, practitioners
generally try to ensure the widest coverage possible for the
attorney-client privilege, with a high threshold for waiver,
because they never know when they will be the unlucky victim
of accidental disclosure. Second, attorney use of e-mail for
client communication was already a widespread practice by
1999. While lawyers may have worried about security, their
concerns apparently did not prevent them from using the tech-
nology when they found it convenient or necessary. The "sigh
of relief' that greeted the ABA decision, for example, implies
that lawyers were reassured about the propriety about what
they were already doing, not just that they were relieved of a
complicated burden for what they might do in the future.0 3
An ABA determination that encryption was required would
have implicitly judged lawyers nationwide as previously having
abandoned their clients' privilege.
The impact of the differing rates of development is easily
illustrated. Had encryption technology developed at the same
rate as e-mail technology, and achieved the same level of pene-
tration, the result would clearly have been different. For exam-
ple, if e-mail technology had developed in the mid-1990s with
built-in encryption methods that were easy to use and included
within commercial e-mail products, lawyers would never dream
of using an e-mail system that did not provide for such
protections. Similarly, if e-mail interception technology was
more highly developed even now-if, say, someone wrote a
foolproof sniffer program that was widely available--lawyers
103 Leibowitz, supra note 86, at 5.
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might be more inclined to secure their e-mail. It is only in an
environment where e-mail technology far outpaced encryption
and interception technologies that the no-encryption standard
could have developed.
But to set a hard standard by which encryption is never
going to be necessary ignores the pace of technological change.
Even at the time that the ABA's opinion was released, some
observers noted that attorneys should be aware of the potential
changes in the state of the art that might make the ABA's
opinion obsolete or impractical.' The New York ethics opin-
ion made this clear, asserting an attorney's duty to "stay
abreast of this evolving technology to assess any changes in
the likelihood of interception as well as the availability of im-
proved technologies that may reduce such risks at reasonable
cost."' This would make sense because the alternative is a
static, unchanging set of rules governing e-mail use that does
not adapt to changing conditions.0 6
Nevertheless, some practitioners have argued that the
New York ethics board was wrong to put this onus on lawyers,
that lawyers do not have the expertise to make such judg-
ments, and that, hence, they are under no obligation to keep
up with the technology. °7 Indeed, one commentator said that
the New York board's caveat would require lawyers to "scram-
ble land line telephone conversations to foil wiretappers, line
their office walls with lead to disable bug transmitters, up-
grade to ever more powerful encryption, and so on."' But
' Id. (citing lawyers and technology experts who pointed out that ethical stan-
dards might change as the "technology changes over time"). As Charles R. Merrill,
head of the computer and high-tech practice group at a New Jersey firm, stated in
the article, "[Miaking a pronouncement without recognizing that tech standards
may change is a little out of step" with reality. Id.
! N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 709, at § D (1998).
10 The board's caveat is also consistent with the principle articulated by Judge
Hand in The T. J. Hooper case that custom of use based on prevailing technology
might not control as the state of the art develops. See infra Part III.B.
1"7 William Frievogel, Internet Communications-Part II: A Larger Perspective,
ALAS Loss PREVENTION J., Jan. 1997, at 2-3, as cited in Robert A. Pikowsky,
Privilege and Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Communication Via E-Mail, 51
BAYLOR L. REV. 483, 559 (1999). According to Pikowsky's account of Frievogel's
advisory, Frievogel argues that lawyers do not have an obligation to stay abreast
of technological changes that might make using e-mail more or less secure because
lawyers are unqualified to have the expertise to understand the technology and
because they should have the freedom to rely on the legal protections available.
Id. at 578.
1.8 Id. It is uninspiring that Frievogel and the Attorney's Liability Assurance
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asking that lawyers avoid using state-of-the-art technologies
without being certain of their security or taking advantage of
available safety precautions does not itself require lawyers to
adopt every conceivable safety precaution for every possible
communication technology.0 9 The New York board's sensible
reminder to stay abreast of the technology only applies to law-
yers using state-of-the-art technology in Internet communica-
tions. If attorneys want to take advantage of those new types
of communications, they should educate themselves about the
security limitations. Lawyers talking in the sanctity of their
offices, or over old-technology land-line telephones, are clearly
respecting and protecting the privilege."0 But lawyers who
want to use "newfangled" equipment for its ease and conve-
nience, who thereby cast their confidential information over an
Internet system over which they or their agents have no do-
minion, who rely solely on the unpredictability of the e-mail's
Society (the "ALAS") would take the position that encryption is not necessary and
that attorneys need not take special precautions to protect client security because
the ALAS is in the business of underwriting legal malpractice insurance. See
Winick et al., supra note 44, at 1254-55.
"' Pikowsky also argues that analogies to Judge Hand's opinion in The T. J.
Hooper are "irrelevant" because that case "is usually cited in maritime cases" and
has not been cited "in the context of legal ethics, evidentiary privileges, or pro-
fessional liability." Pikowsky, supra note 107, at 577. This argument does not real-
ly stand up to any analysis. No one argues that The T.J. Hooper is a binding
precedent on issues of privilege (or that it is binding in any other jurisdiction),
but the principles established therein are helpful when we have no direct binding
precedent at all. The T. J. Hooper has become a landmark case in negligence
theory generally, establishing the proposition that reliance on custom is not neces-
sarily a defense to negligence, and the theory upon which the case is grounded
has clear application to an attorney's ethical duty to use precautions appropriate
for the technology she uses. Even Hricik, whose influential 1998 article found that
encryption was unnecessary as a bright line rule, agreed that Judge Hand's "semi-
nal opinion" was applicable for determining the level of precautions necessary.
Hricik, supra note 3, at 506; see also LUWSON, supra note 62, at 233-34 (arguing
for applying Hand principles). The examples of lawyers having to debug their
conference rooms are simply silly, but more pernicious is the idea that lawyers
should be able to blithely ignore the state of the art when taking advantage of
modern technology. If a lawyer wishes to use e-mail, or a cell phone, she has a
duty to ensure that her communications are secure.
110 Moreover, as I demonstrate in Part HI, infra, a lawyer who inadvertently
does reveal her client's confidences is protected so long as she used reasonable
precautions. If a lawyer in fact knew that her offices were bugged, she would
indeed be under an obligation to put up tin foil around her room or otherwise find
some way to protect the privilege. But a lawyer is under no obligation to take
ridiculously scrupulous precautions, like the ones suggested by Frievogel, as a
general practice.
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route through various unknown servers and networks, and
who fail to keep abreast of emerging technologies like encryp-
tion that might make this trip more secure, are just as clearly
trusting the confidentiality of their communications to a tech-
nology they do not understand and whose security is deeply
questionable.
3. Uniqueness: The Limitations of Analogy
From its earliest inception, the debate over e-mail and
attorney-client privilege, like all arguments about new technol-
ogies, was a debate about the applicable analogy. Indeed, the
prevailing argument can be boiled down to two extremes: is e-
mail like a postcard sent through the mails, visible to anyone
who comes across it, or is it like a land-line phone call,
interceptable but only by a dedicated, technically savvy crimi-
nal?
But the battle over e-mail has largely been about the inad-
equacy of these competing analogies and the failure by the
ABA and other ethics boards to recognize the problems with
trying to analogize new media to old. This is not a problem
limited to e-mail and the attorney-client privilege, of course,
because the Internet has been peculiarly besieged by inade-
quate analogical arguments."' This is probably because the
Internet is no one particular medium; rather, it is a composite
of media, all of which have their old-media predecessors. The
static web page resembles a newspaper, streaming media com-
pares to radio and television, online bulletin boards equate to
their real-time counterparts, etc. The problem with trying to
pigeonhole e-mail is the classic challenge of trying to detect the
elephant blindfolded-it all depends on which part you exam-
ine. E-mail has the transparency of a postcard to anyone with
access to the network server over which it passes, but for
someone to have that kind of access she either belongs there (a
system administrator) or most certainly does not belong there
(a hacker), in which case the barriers to her access seem awful-
ly similar to those between the wiretapper and the phone line.
. See Wallace & Green, supra note 40, at 720 (discussing analogical challenges
of the Internet).
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Admittedly, e-mail has certain similarities to land-line
phone calls." 2 Both traditionally are communicated over a
physical line that is outside the control of the sender (we have
as little control over the physical phone lines for calls as we do
the networks for e-mail) and both are compromised only by
someone who is particularly technically gifted and armed with
the appropriate tools. But e-mail is also different in several
significant and material respects, particularly with regard to
the lack of dominion and control that we have over an e-mail
once it leaves our computers. Although a phone caller does not
have any physical control over the telephone wires upon which
her call is transmitted, we do have recognizable, identifiable
carriers whose responsibility it is to maintain and control those
lines. The "telephone company," whatever corporate entity that
is, has dominion over those telephone wires, and any failure to
maintain security over the wires is either the result of some-
one who physically intrudes on the wire or who compromises
the entity itself. With the Internet, though, we do not send our
e-mails over identifiable agencies, we do not get to control who
it is that will forward our messages, and there is no one entity
that is responsible for the accurate, safe transmission of our
messages."' Moreover, when you place a telephone call, you
establish an actual, exclusive connection between two points
through which the communication travels, while e-mail mes-
sages travel an unforeseeable path with stops along the way.
The proper analogy is not to our familiar phone system, but to
an imaginary phone system that outsources all control over
maintenance and security to various unknown entities, and
has a virtually untraceable and unpredictable routing system
for all calls."'
112 ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at Intro.
m" Although we can ultimately trace back the path that an e-mail takes, cur-
rent technology does not allow us to predetermine that path.
... Mainstream Internet analogies proposed by e-mail friendly commentators
seem to try to smooth over the Internet routing process, preferring to see it as an
anonymous, mechanical process in which no human being has access to the con-
fidential material. In contrast, like the analogy described above that takes into
account the practical implications of sending an e-mail through the Internet,
Winick compares Internet e-mail to "a postal system that opened, copied, and
stored every letter as it passed through each post office or delivery station along
the letter's route." Winick et al., supra note 44, at 1245.
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Indeed, a far more applicable analogy is to compare e-
mals to wireless phone calls using portable, cellular, or mobile
digital technology."5 Some commentators and state ethics
boards have tried to distinguish cellular calls on the ground
that they are broadcast,"6 which seems to be almost a face-
tiously literal distinction, like saying that newspapers are
different from web pages because, well, they are published on
paper. Differences in the inherent physical nature of two given
media are important, but even more important are the similar-
ities in the fundamental communicational dynamic: messages
on both media are cast outside of the sender's control into an
environment in which they are vulnerable to interception, they
can only be compromised by someone with serious technical
knowhow and the proper equipment,"' they are protected by
federal statutes from interception,"8 and they can be protect-
ed from interception through encryption technology."9 In-
deed, the major difference between the technologies is that the
ABA has officially endorsed attorney use of unencrypted e-
mails, but it has declined to render an opinion on wireless
phones. 2 ' Numerous state ethics boards, though, have offi-
cially discouraged the use of wireless phones for confidential
communications. 2'
... See Harris, supra note 88, at 402 (making the comparison between cellular
phones and e-mail); Hricik, supra note 3, at 484 (discussing vulnerability of cellu-
lar phone calls).
11. Miller, supra note 88, at 622 (drawing distinction between the Internet and
cell/cordless phones because e-mail is not sent through public airwaves).
117 See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Cell, Cordless and Digital Phones Raise Privilege,
Privacy Questions, NATVL L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at B20; Auslander, supra note 53, at
5 ("Intercepted cell phone calls are instantly comprehensible, and current cell
phone technology is highly susceptible to interception. Calls are broadcast on radio
signals that can be picked up by other cordless phones, radios, even baby moni-
tors.").
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 5701 (1994).
119 Hricik, supra note 3, at 485 (noting that improvements in cell technology
might obviate privacy concerns).
12' ABA Opinion, supra note 5, at § B.3; see also Auslander, supra note 53, at
3 (noting that Formal Op. No. 99-413 discussed cell phone use, but it declined to
give an opinion).
121 See Mass. Ethics Op. No. 94-5 (1994); N.H. Ethics Op. No. 1991-92/6 (1992);
N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Op. No. 1994-11 (1994); N.C. Op. 215 (1995); Iowa Ethics Op.
No. 90-44 (1994). In United States u. Mathis, the court held that a client's cordless
phone conversation with his attorney was not protected, finding that the client
could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over a cordless phone. 96 F.3d
1577, 1583 (11th Cir. 1996).
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The only practical justification for this distinction must be
not in the security of the technology-they are equally secure
or insecure, depending on your perspective-but in the pene-
tration and complexity of the technology. Lawyers have a
greater understanding of cellular phone vulnerabilities because
the technology is more intuitive and familiar (i.e., lawyers
understand the concept of broadcasting better) and there have
been some high profile cases of interception that have acted as
warnings. 122 But if we are to draw an analogy between e-mail
and any other medium, wireless phones are a great deal closer
to the mark than the land-line phones that have served as a
point of comparison for the ABA and many state ethics boards.
Moreover, we have to begin recognizing that not all e-mail
is transferred over traditional land-based telephone wires. The
technology develops much more quickly than the law review
editing process, so any article (including this one) addressing
the "state of the art" is outdated by the time it is published. So
virtually everything written to this point assuming that e-mail
travels over land-based wires has to be re-evaluated to adjust
for the explosion of wireless e-mail communications through
BlackBerrys, hand-held wireless devices, such as the Palm
personal digital assistant, and now even cellular phones.1"
Quickly, the consensus built around the analogy between e-
mail and land-based phones now has to account for the proba-
bility that many of the attorney-client e-mails will be sent or
retrieved through the air. And in many of those cases, one
party or the other might not even know that her counterpart is
using a wireless device and might not account for the increased
security dangers. The analogy between e-mail and wireless
phones, then, becomes even stronger as the technologies
change.
Finally, e-mails can be differentiated from land-line phone
calls in one seriously material way: the availability of an en-
cryption option. This distinction rids the analogy of relevance
because as encryption becomes an available, viable technology,
"2 For example, in one celebrated case, a cellular conversation with then Con-
gressman Newt Gingrich was intercepted by a police scanner and recorded. 2 BNA
Electronic Info. Pol'y & L. Rep., 151 (Feb. 7, 1997).
12 See Amy Harmon, E-Mail You Can't Outrun, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at
G12 (discussing wireless web appliances). The BlackBerry Pager is a wireless e-
mail device that is continually connected to the Internet. Id.
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there is no good reason not to use it. If every telephone came
with automatic scrambling capable of defeating eavesdropping,
attorneys would be likely to use that as well; that such tech-
nology is becoming reasonable for e-mail use practically com-
pels attorneys to exceed the minimum requirements imposed
by the ABA.
4. Conclusions
These factors-the incomplete understanding of the tech-
nology and the rate at which it would change, the uneven
penetration of e-mail and encryption technologies in society,
and the inadequacy of old media analogies-combine to under-
mine the reliability of the consensus on the no-encryption stan-
dard.124 This consensus, and the ABA's seal of approval, gives
attorneys a false sense of security in e-mail transmissions.
Lawyers are, consequently, almost certainly using unencrypted
e-mail for sensitive or confidential documents. Anecdotally, it
is common for attorneys who are under tremendous time pres-
sures to work on documents from home, and it is much easier
to simply e-mail an attached document back and forth from
office to home than it is to constantly worry about saving it to
disk and carrying it around.1" Even though encryption in
those cases would be fairly simple, since the attorneys are
generally using the same two computers and could easily in-
stall the appropriate software on both, lawyers have been
lulled into believing that encryption is not necessary. That is to
some extent a misreading not only of the ABA opinion, but also
the cautious warnings made by most commentators on this
issue, who have rejected a bright-line encryption standard
. At the very least, the absence of judicial guidance and the somewhat con-
flicted viewpoints expressed in academia and by ethics boards leads to some con-
cern that the standards expressed in what I have called this "consensus" are in
fact unreliable. One commentator noted that the lack of judicial authority on e-
mail security, and the body of commentary warning of it, has itself "created a
sense of unease regarding the use of e-mail for privileged and confidential commu-
nications." Harris, supra note 88, at 395-97. The uncertainty continues to the pres-
ent day.
" See, e.g., Rebecca Porter, Technology Bloat? Become a 'Thin' Client, 36-May
TRIAL 92 (May 2000) (reporting that lawyers will often simply e-mail documents
from their offices to their home to work on them there and save the time of sav-
ing the document to disk).
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while still recommending encryption for particularly sensitive
information. 121 While some lawyers might actually be follow-
ing this advice in practice, encrypting particularly sensitive in-
formation or otherwise avoiding transmitting it through e-
mail, 127 the ABA's opinion has still created blind assumptions
among the profession that e-mail is generally safe.
Consequently, any lawyer, or anyone who has a friend who
is a lawyer, is aware of the standard protection most law firms
now provide for e-mail, a disclaimer appended to the bottom of
every message, regardless of whether the e-mail is a privileged
communication, a private letter between friends, or the ump-
teenth reiteration of some virus hoax or hoary joke: "The infor-
mation contained in this e-mail message may be privileged,
confidential, and protected from disclosure. If you are not the
intended recipient, any dissemination, distribution, or copying
is strictly prohibited. If you think that you have received this
e-mail message in error, please e-mail the sender .... 128
That disclaimer, also familiar to anyone who has received a
facsimile from a lawyer in the last five years, is for the most
126 Hricik, supra note 3, at 507 (agreeing that encryption might sometimes be
appropriate); Simon, supra note 89, at 540-41 (saying that encryption is a reason-
able alternative). Oddly, even the proponents of the no-encryption standard recog-
nize that there are times when particularly important or confidential information
should not be sent via non-encrypted e-mail. But that argument seems to concede
the point at issue: when we discuss protecting the attorney-client privilege, we are
certainly not especially worried about an e-mail between lawyer and client plan-
ning, say, the menu for lunch, or setting up a schedule of meetings. Obviously,
trivial communications between attorney and client need not be encrypted because
the privilege only applies narrowly to protect information exchanged in confidence
to obtain counsel. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (holding
that the attorney-client privilege only holds secret communications made in confi-
dence to a lawyer to obtain legal counsel); see also United States v. Kovel, 296
F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961). Conceding that truly important information should
be encrypted gives away the argument, unless you are willing to say that some
client confidences are more important than others.
1 See Annemarie Franczyk, Play it Safe to Keep E-Mail Secrets, BUS. FIRST
BuFFALo, May 15, 2000, at 37 (interviewing a lawyer who restricts "electronic
correspondence to noncritical matters").
" E-mail from Joshua M. Masur, attorney, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe,
to Joseph W. Rand, Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Oct. 4, 2000,
19:13.01 EST) (on file with author). The message was part of our correspondence
on issues relating to e-mail security, none of which, of course, contained any confi-
dential information. The irony that the automatic disclaimer was placed on mes-
sages describing the inherent inadequacy of the automatic disclaimer for protecting
the privilege was not lost on us.
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part the extent of security most attorneys put on their e-mail
communications.'29 Although there are no published studies
to date on the e-mail habits of attorneys, anecdotal evidence
suggests that most attorneys rely on the consensus reached by
state ethics boards and the ABA that encryption is not a neces-
sary security precaution.3 '
One of the arguments in favor of the no-encryption stan-
dard, of course, is that the whole issue is a lot of smoke with-
out any real fire, considering that there are no reported in-
stances of actual e-mail interception and no courts that have
even been called upon to weigh in on the issue.'3' But we
have to remember that Internet e-mail, for all its ubiquity, is
still a nascent medium, one that for practical purposes did not
exist even five years ago; it is not surprising that disputes
have not yet developed sufficiently to require judicial resolu-
tion, especially considering the pace of judicial response to
technological change." 2 Moreover, arguments that there have
been no published reports of interception are unpersuasive.
Neither party to an e-mail interception has an incentive to
report the incident because the victim has suffered a breach in
security and potentially committed an ethical violation while
the interceptor has potentially committed a crime.'33 Indeed,
'" Eric G. Kraft, The Increasing Use of the Internet In the Practice of Law, 69
J. KAN. B.A. 15, Feb. 2000, at 19 (offering disclaimer as a protection for e-mail
messages).
.30 As part of my research on this issue, I contacted a number of attorneys at
law firms in New York and San Francisco, as well as litigation support specialists
at several large law firms, and I found that none of them routinely encrypted
Internet e-mail. See, e.g., E-mail from Curtis E. A. Karnow, lawyer and author, to
Joseph W. Rand, Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Oct. 5, 2000, 11:54.14
EST) (on file with author) ("It may be when encryption is as simple as clicking on
a button that not using it will appear unreasonable; but right now that's not the
case .... No lawyer I know does that.") [hereinafter Karnow e-mail]; E-mail from
Christopher Corey, Systems Administrator, to Joseph W. Rand, Instructor of Law,
Brooklyn Law School (Nov. 8, 2000, 19:56.36 EST) (on file with author) (indicating
that firms generally do not use encryption for e-mail).
131 Karnow e-mail, supra note 130 (indicating that a survey of a group of law-
yers at a convention revealed that no one had heard of instances of e-mail inter-
ception).
"3 See KARNOW, supra note 22, at 5 ("Of course, the law is always 'behind the
curve,' in a sense, regardless of the industry involved and regardless of the area
of law.")
133 LAWSON, supra note 62, at 222 (asserting that e-mail interception is more
likely than lawyers think). Lawson also argues that e-mail tampering is a difficult
crime to detect, leaving behind little physical evidence. LAWSON, supra note 62, at
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actual cases regarding waiver of privilege of any type are un-
usual, and most cases involve accidental disclosures during
document productions."'
At some point, though, there will come a test case. A
lawyer's e-mail to her client is going to be inadvertently dis-
closed, either through interception or through misdirection,
and her opponents are going to argue waiver of the privilege.
When that happens, the court, like Judge Hand in The T. J.
Hooper, might not be particularly satisfied if the only defense
to the waiver is the argument that the lawyer was following
the prevailing custom that security precautions were unnec-
essary.
III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION OVER THE INTERNET
The problem with the no-encryption standard is not just
that it lulls attorneys into thinking that their e-mail communi-
cations with clients are safe and secure. Rather, the more
pernicious result is that the consensus on e-mail sets a stan-
dard that might become the default rule for new information
technologies on the Internet. Without a court deciding a case,
attorneys and ethics boards might coalesce around the position
that the Internet is an inherently safe medium because the
most visible Internet application has been declared secure
enough. Indeed, standards, once affixed, are difficult to dis-
lodge, and any caveats or disclaimers are soon forgotten. The
Supreme Court, for example, ruled in Reno v. ACLU1 5 that
222.
'34 See infra Part III.B.
"' Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The Supreme Court relied on facts
adopted by the district court, which were based on stipulations of the parties and
hearings in early 1996. Thus, the Court's opinion a year later was essentially
decided on mid-1996 technology. Id. at 849 (indicating reliance on extensive find-
ings of fact). The district court even had identified the types of communications
technologies available at the time: one to one messaging, such as e-mail; one to
many messaging, such as a listserv; distributed message databases, such as
newsgroups; real time communication, such as chat; real time remote computer
utilization, such as telnet; and remote information retrieval. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). By the
time of the Supreme Court's Reno decision, though, the technology of the Internet
had advanced significantly due to the commercial explosion of Internet-based com-
merce. For example, streaming technology is not mentioned in the opinion, but by
1998 it was the focus of a great deal of commercial development. See William M.
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the Internet should receive the highest First Amendment
protections applicable to print media, not the lower protections
applicable to radio or television. Reno was decided when
Internet technology was decidedly newsprint-like, with its
static web pages, e-mail media, and bulletin boards, but the
holding will likely persevere despite the technological innova-
tions, like streaming audio and video, that make the Internet
look much more like broadcast media.136 The same dynamic
might hold for the no-encryption standard: if e-mail is safe,
then all the other document transmission technologies becom-
ing available might also automatically be considered safe with-
out any sort of independent review by lawyers too technologi-
cally awkward to, in their minds, re-open the issue of Internet
security.
This Part discusses the legal standard to which lawyers
should be held in protecting the attorney-client privilege in
light of these technological changes, starting with a brief look
at some of the information and communications technologies
lawyers are starting to use on the Internet and concluding
with the development of a standard for assessing precautions
lawyers should take in implementing these new technologies.
A. The New Internet Communication Technologies
The Internet is going to revolutionize the practice of law,
both in the way that attorneys share, retrieve, store, and man-
age information, and in the ways they communicate with each
other and with clients. Throughout this Article, I have been
predominantly discussing e-mail technology, which is clearly
the dominant method of file sharing and communication now
available on the Internet. Indeed, e-mail may maintain that
position for years, considering its various advantages in uni-
versality and ease of use. But there are other technologies that
lawyers are already starting to integrate into their practices.
Bulkeley, Radio Stations Make Waves on the Web, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1998, at
B1 (discussing development of netcasting).
..G Student commentary following the decision made this point: "Several ongoing
technological developments may affect the Court's conclusions regarding whether
the Internet can be constitutionally regulated. The Internet is increasingly becom-
ing more akin to radio and television." Note, Indecent Speech-Communications De-
cency Act, 111 HARV. L. REV. 329, 336 (1997).
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1. Document Sharing and Storage
The new technological leap that lawyers are taking is in
the management and storage of documents and information on
the Internet. Lawyers have long used databases and intranets
to store and share documents, but Internet technology is spur-
ring superior methods of handling information. Lawyers are
now being inundated with new commercial services called
Application Service Providers ("ASPs") that will allow them to
move more of their practices onto the Internet."7 ASPs are
Internet-based services that provide technical assistance for
such mundane tasks, such as law firm accounting, billing, pay-
roll, and office administration, and for such critical functions,
such as case management, document assembly, document pro-
duction, and legal research.'
The most significant type of ASP for purposes here is the
online document repository, which is a third-party vendor that
establishes a centralized, secure Internet site containing all
case data.3 ' For example, CaseCentral, Inc., one of the most
well-known Internet-based document repositories, sets up such
sites for individual litigation cases, particularly in situations
involving multiple law firms or clients." ' The individualized
web site may contain transcripts of all hearings, depositions, or
trial testimony, electronic scans of evidentiary documents,
images of all exhibits, and databases containing internal mem-
1 Robert J. Ambrogi, ASPs Zero in on the Legal Market, 43 RES GESTAE 25
(Apr. 2000). Ambrogi quotes the online resource "Webopedia" as defining ASPs as
"third-party entities that manage and distribute software-based services and solu-
tions to customers across a wide area network from a central data server." Id.; see
also William R. Friedman, The ABA Techshow: It's Not as Geeky as You Might
Think, 9 LAW. J. 5 (May 5, 2000) (describing ASPs).
138 Cary Griffith, More Methods to Managing Litigation Over the Internet, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES 21 (July 2000) (identifying various ASPs); Porter, supra note 125
(listing legal ASPs); Noel D. Humphreys, Advent of 'Application Service Providers'
Raises Many Potential Issues, 22 PA. LAW. 40 (Jan./Feb. 2000) (same).
... Chris Santella, Does the Web Change Everything?: Traditional Trial Support
Software Still Has a Large Role to Play, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at T4 [hereinaf-
ter Santella, Trial Support Software]. For other news articles about online docu-
ment repositories, see Cary Griffith, Some Methods to Manage Litigation on the
Internet, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 2000, 17, at BI; Mark Voorhees, The Market
Has Spoken, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 29, 1999, at B10; Mark Voorhees, It's a Web World
After All, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at A22.
"O Santella, Trial Support Software, supra note 139, at T4 (describing
CaseCentral's interface).
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oranda, legal research, and docketing data." The interface
on document repositories is a standard web-based presenta-
tion, "as Yahoo-like as possible,"42 to allow attorneys and cli-
ents to maneuver in a familiar environment.
Law firms have also been setting up their own private web
sites, called "extranets," that they share with clients, usually
for a particular case.' An extranet site is a secure environ-
ment that provides the same types of services as an online
document repository, although it is mostly used to share docu-
ments between lawyers and individual clients.'" The advan-
tage of extranets is that they are easier to set up and often
smaller, usually linked to the main firm web page, deal- or
case-specific, and useful for specific transactions and smaller
litigations. 5
The advantages of moving document repositories and case
files to the Internet are obvious. Lawyers can access tran-
scripts or exhibits from anywhere in the country or the world
from a web-connected laptop, collaborators can work on drafts
of documents from remote locations, and firms can save on the
..1 Santella, Trial Support Software, supra note 139, at T4.
2 Libby DeBlasio, Taking it to the Web: Online Document Repositories Offer
Mobility and Cut Out the Need for Couriers, But What About Security?, THE RE-
CORDER S4 (Nov. 1999) (quoting an employee of CaseCentral).
14 Chris Santella, Clients are Calling For Extranets: Providing Superior Client
Service, 16 TEE. LAW., Apr. 24, 2000, at 12 ("[E]xtranets offer an easy-to-use, more
robust alternative to e-mail.") [hereinafter Santella, Extranets]; Judith Flournoy,
Going Beyond E-Mail for Collaboration Tools, LAW TECH. PROD. NEWS, Apr. 2000,
at 16 (describing adoption of extranet by law firm); Clarie Barliant, The X Factor:
What Firms Do With Extranets, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 20, 2000, at T4 (noting that Davis,
Polk & Wardwell and Weil, Gotshal & Manges are setting up extranets for indi-
vidual clients, tailored to the client's industry); Alan Cohen, "Extra Efficiencies":
Law Firm Extranets Bring Teamwork On-Line, N.Y.L.J, Sept. 13, 1999, at S3.
14. See Barliant, supra note 143, at T4. Extranets are not exactly new technolo-
gy because reports on them date back to 1998. In 1998, for example, the law firm
Latham & Watkins developed a system that serviced 1700 users in 13 offices from
Los Angeles to Moscow. M. Sean Fosmire, Intranets and Extranets-The Extension
of Web Technology to the Distribution of Private Information, 77 MICH. B. J. 412
(1998); see also Allison Manning & Stephen Roussan, Extranets Let Lawyers Plug
into 'Case Site: Web Site Enables Remote Case Management and Collaboration,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1998, at S5. Recent reports indicate, though, that law firms
have not yet adapted to the new technology. See Barliant, supra note 143, at T4
(noting in March 2000 that only "a handful of true pioneers" have taken to
extranets).
" Cohen, supra note 143, at S3 (describing adoption of extranet technology by
Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett).
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enormous storage and reproduction costs associated with large
litigations or corporate transactions. 14 6 The Internet provides
an ideal environment for collaboration and communication
between an attorney and client because it is platform-indepen-
dent, allowing users of different computer systems and applica-
tions to work together without conflicting technical stan-
dards.'47
The major problem in implementing such technologies, of
course, is providing security for the information. Although no
court has ruled definitively on the security of online reposito-
ries or extranets, and no ethics board to date has considered
the issue, the privilege implications would seem to be even
greater than for e-mail.'48 Although this Article has argued
that e-mail is not a secure medium, e-mail starts looking much
safer when you compare it to the dangers of putting confiden-
tial documents on web sites. First, an e-mail, for all its inher-
ent insecurity, is transitory and dynamic, and although copies
might be saved on servers in the "store and forward" method,
an e-mail is generally only (or most) vulnerable during trans-
mission. Documents stored on a web page, though, are perpetu-
ally available in a static form, continually vulnerable if unpro-
tected. Second, e-mails are by their nature unlikely to convey
all that much information (unless of course they attach memo-
randa), while the types of documents put in repositories or
extranets are often exactly the sorts of information lawyers do
not want to make publicly available.'49
146 Santella, Extranets, supra note 143, at 12 ("[T]here's little question that
repository-based solutions will one day become the status quo. A web-based system
affords easy access to road warrior litigators, co-counsel working on multi-district
litigations, or counsel of the same firm working from disparate locations.").
14 Using e-mail, attorneys and clients can have difficulties working on drafts of
documents because there is no central, authoritative version upon which they can
all comment. Using an online document repository, though, all the users comment
on the same draft. Brett A. Balmer, Web Sites Let Lawyers Discuss Cases and
Collaborate on Documents, LEGAL TIMES (Dec. 13, 1999).
"4 Hricik, supra note 3, at 486 (indicating that extranet communications are
private, though relying on land-based phone line distinction rather than any secu-
rity protocols). Hricik's description of the technology is naturally complete only for
the time period in which it was written, but he does note that some state bar
associations have specifically passed on intranets. Hricik, supra note 3, at 486.
.49 Making the documents available to the ASPs or extranet systems adminis-
trators themselves -does not endanger the privilege because courts have extended
its protection to any agent of the attorney. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d
918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961).
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Generally, though, reports indicate that ASP's providing
document repositories and firms setting up extranets are
aware of these security risks and are acting accordingly to
provide online documents with protections generally not ex-
tended to Internet e-mail. 5 ' Although early reports on
extranets indicated that some firms were setting them up with
simple password protections (which are easily compromised
either through human error or technical expertise), 5' most
established vendors provide up to three types of security proto-
cols: login names and passwords for all users, firewalls to se-
cure data on safe servers, and secure socket layer encryption
that assures that a third party intercepting a document
download gets only encrypted text.'52 Some vendors even go a
step further. For example, CaseCentral gives firms login
names, passwords, and digital identification cards that contain
a code number that changes every sixty seconds and is syn-
chronized with the central network; users have to enter the
code to log onto the network. 3
2. Communications
The Internet is also developing new technologies for com-
munications in addition to the ubiquitous e-mail. The most
prominent developing technology is really just a variation on
an established theme-the movement to wireless Internet
communications. Several popular personal digital assistants
like the BlackBerry pager and the Palm VII handheld provide
wireless Internet access, allowing users to access e-mail from
anywhere they can access their respective networks.'54 More-
' The Internet now also has all sorts of commercial file hosting services, such
as Freedrive and Click2Send, which will store, for example, twenty megabytes of
information for free under a user name and password, but those files are not
sufficiently protected for any sorts of confidential material.
1.. See Fosmire, supra note 144, at 414 (indicating that one firm had set up an
extranet with only password protection).
152 John C. Tredennick, Using Extranets to Build Client Relationships, 9/00 LAW
TECH. PROD. NEWS Sept. 2000, at 12; Santella, Extranets, supra note 143, at 12
("An extranet that lacks robust firewalls and stringent encryption measures is next
to worthless.").
1" DeBlasio, supra note 142, at S4. As one attorney noted, "It's probably easi-
er-and would reap greater success-if someone illicitly seeking information were
to go through a firm's trash bins in order to find documents." Id.
11. See Harmon, supra note 123, at G1 (stating that lawyers, "notoriously slow
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over, vendors are now offering completely wireless local area
networks,'55 indicating that lawyers might soon be using
extranets that are partly accessible through the wireless
Internet.
Wireless technology has enormous advantages for lawyers
who cannot keep a laptop plugged constantly into a land-based
Internet connection. In one report, for example a litigator was
defending a deposition when he realized that opposing counsel
was mischaracterizing a speech given by the deponent; he
wrote a quick e-mail on his handheld computer to his secre-
tary, who e-mailed him a copy of the speech within three min-
utes, allowing him to clarify the record on re-direct.'56
Wireless technology, of course, undermines completely the
argument that e-mail is analogous to traditional phone calls
because much business e-mail will probably, in the near fu-
ture, be retrieved from a wireless device. And wireless commu-
nications are as easily intercepted as mobile phone calls, al-
though there are indications that the new wireless appliances
come standard with encryption.'57 It is likely that wireless
communications would be governed by the same precaution
standards as mobile phones, with encryption as a standard
safety protocol.15
to embrace e-mail in the office, have become enthralled by the BlackBerry"); Chris
Santella, E-Mail on the Run, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at B8 (describing avail-
able wireless handhelds); Alan Cohen, Wireless Wonders: Small, Light, and They
Do E-Mail, Too, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 1999, at T3 (describing evolution of wireless
web).
" Lucent is advertising a "wireless, secure 11 Mbps broadband
Internet/intranet access in public hotspots: hotels (lobbies and rooms), airports
(lounges and gates), shared office spaces, multi-dwelling units, convention centers,
and university campuses." Lucent.com, at http://www.lucent.com/ins/managedservices
(last visited Feb. 13, 2001).
... Santella, Extranets, supra note 143, at 12.
157 The home page for BlackBerry indicates that a high-end version of its pager
has an "end-to-end security system whereby all corporate e-mail remains encrypted
at all points between the desktop PC and the BlackBerry handheld, meeting stan-
dard corporate security guidelines." BlackBerry Wireless Email Solution, at
http://www.blackberry.netoverview.
... Another technology joining the legal mainstream is called instant messaging,
which could cause many of the same types of challenges as e-mail. Instant mes-
sages pop up on the receiver's screen as they are sent, rather than being stored
on e-mail servers awaiting retrieval. Ashby Jones, When E-mail's Not Fast Enough,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 2000, at Bl. Jones' article indicated that two law firms were
actively using instant messaging, but through a private network, not through com-
mercially available services like the America Online instant messaging program.
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B. The Attorney-Client Privilege and New Technologies
The final step in the analysis is to examine what guide-
lines lawyers should follow in incorporating these new informa-
tion technologies into their practice while still protecting the
attorney-client privilege. Judge Friendly defined the contours
of the attorney-client privilege for the Second Circuit in 1961,
quoting a famous formulation of Wigmore's-the privilege
applies:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relat-
ing to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are
at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself
or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived."5 9
Although that articulation seems to protect only communica-
tions by the client to the attorney, courts within the circuit
(and elsewhere) have applied it to advice rendered from at-
torney to client, so long as the advice reflects confidential in-
formation conveyed by the client.160
The privilege only attaches, though, if the parties contem-
poraneously intended to keep the communication confidential,
and have not disclosed the communication to anyone outside
the privilege: "[Ilt is vital to a claim of privilege that the com-
munications between client and attorney were made in confi-
dence and have been maintained in confidence." 16 1 Because
the privilege impedes the search for truth by restricting the
ability of courts and the public to discover all relevant evi-
dence, courts strictly confine it within the "narrowest possible
Id.
159 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961); see also United
States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1999) (reiterating
formulation); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d
Cir.1984) (same); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton re. ed. 1961); cf.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503(a) (McKinney's 1999) (codifying the attorney-client privilege
under New York State law).
" See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), 160 F.R.D. 437
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). Weinstein and Berger note that the rationale behind the privilege
is utilitarian because it encourages full disclosure from clients who might not
otherwise seek legal advice. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503.03(1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.
1997).
... In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1973).
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limits" to protect only those actual confidences, 16 2 and courts
put the burden of proof on the party trying to apply the privi-
lege.16 If a party breaches the confidentiality of a privileged
communication, she risks waiving this evidentiary privilege;
moreover, a lawyer who fails to protect confidential communi-
cations also violates her ethical obligations, exposing her client
to the substantive harm caused by the disclosure of sensitive,
private information."
The relevant likely situation in which an attorney might
have to confront the possibility of waiving the privilege over a
document would be if an Internet-based transmission was
either intercepted or inadvertently disclosed to someone out-
side the privilege. For example, if the attorney e-mailed a priv-
ileged document over the Internet without encryption, or
through an unencrypted wireless device, the attorney might
risk waiver if the document was intercepted by someone who
invaded the privilege.
Most examinations of the issue of the attorney-client privi-
lege vis-a-vis e-mail have focused on the doctrine of inadver-
tent waiver of privilege as the legal foundation for determining
whether attorneys risk the privilege by using e-mail for confi-
dential documents. Although the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has never specifically adopted an applicable test, courts
outside the circuit have taken three distinct positions in deter-
mining whether an accidental disclosure waives privilege. The
162 Id. at 81 ("[S]ince the attorney-client privilege stands in derogation of the
public's 'right to every man's evidence, ... it ought to be strictly confined within
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.' ") (quoting
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2291).
16 United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989).
16 Lefcourt v. United States, 125 F.3d. 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that attor-
ney is bound to protect the attorney-client privilege under applicable ethical can-
ons). See New York DR 4-101; Model Rule 1.6(a) (providing that an attorney may
not reveal confidential client information unless the client consents after consul-
tation and must take reasonable steps to protect that information from unautho-
rized disclosure or use to protect against waiver); see also Auslander, supra note
53. There is also, though, a question as to whether an attorney who received priv-
ileged material that she knows must have been inadvertently produced has an
ethical obligation to return and not use it. See Kondakjian v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
and N.J., 1996 WL 139782 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (asserting that attorneys have ethical
duty to return inadvertently produced documents); cf. Am. Express v. Accu-Weath-
er, Inc., 1996 WL 346388 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (finding that attorney who
opened package after having been notified by opposing counsel that package con-
tained inadvertently produced privileged material violated ethical duty).
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first can be termed an "automatic waiver" rule, a bright line
test simply dictating that any production of a privileged com-
munication by counsel, whether inadvertent or not, waives that
privilege.'65 Proponents of this position argue that once a
document has lost confidentiality, it can never regain it (the
idea that one cannot "unring a bell") 66 and that the attorney-
client privilege should be narrowly construed only to protect
actual confidences.'67 The second test protects the privilege
from any truly unintentional disclosure, on the theory that the
privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney, so an act of
the attorney cannot effect a waiver."' Under this theory, a
waiver is by definition an intentional relinquishment of a
right, so there can be no such thing as an "inadvertent waiv-
er.'1
69
The district courts within the Second Circuit, though, have
rejected both extreme positions to adopt a sensible balancing
test that provides for waiver if the party "has been so careless
as to surrender any claim that it has taken reasonable steps to
ensure confidentiality."7 ' In determining that level of care-
lessness, courts examine "(1) the reasonableness of the precau-
tions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, (2) the time
taken to rectify the error, (3) the scope of the discovery and the
extent of the disclosure, and (4) overarching issues of fair-
ness."'7' The balancing test is consistent with the goal of the
1" See, e.g., Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456, 457
(D.D.C. 1992); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me.
1992); Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449 (D.
Mass. 1988). This is probably the viewpoint on inadvertent waiver that is closest
to Wigmore's own because Wigmore felt that even an unknown eavesdropper could
undermine application of the privilege. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 81 n.9
(rejecting Wigmore's view) (citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2326).
16 Singh, 140 F.R.D. at 253.
17 See Int'l Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 449.
"6 Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D.
Fla. 1991); Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del.
1990); In re Sealed Case, 120 F.R.D. 66, 72 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
169 See Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
17' SEC v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
.. Id. The Second Circuit has recognized the development of this test without
negative comment, but it has not specifically adopted or applied it. In In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, the court mentioned the four-factor test but noted that the test
was limited to carelessness in document production processes; the court found the
test inapplicable for a case involving a witness who answered some questions in
the grand jury that implicated privileged conversations but refused to answer
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attorney-client privilege to ensure full and frank disclosure
because clients might not be forthcoming if they knew that a
truly inadvertent disclosure, a "minor mistake by otherwise
competent counsel," would result in waiver of any confidenc-
es.'72 But the rule also creates incentives for lawyers to be
careful and take sufficient precautions with client confidences
because an accidental disclosure might waive privilege for the
reckless or careless attorney.
The district courts within the Second Circuit have applied
this test in over two dozen opinions, establishing the contours
of the doctrine, but most of those cases involve fact patterns
that are not particularly efficacious for the issues raised by
online document transmissions. Rather, the vast majority in-
volve inadvertent disclosure during routine document produc-
tions to opposing counsel during discovery. In Aramony v.
United Way of America,'73 for example, the defendant pro-
duced 210 boxes of documents to the plaintiff after almost 800
hours of attorney and paralegal hours of review; included with-
in those boxes were ninety-nine privileged pages that had been
missed during that review.174 Among the privileged docu-
ments, in fact, was an especially damaging memorandum from
an attorney evaluating the merit of potential claims against
his client.'75 In a thorough opinion that painstakingly review-
ed the document production review procedures employed by
the defendant's counsel, Judge Scheindlin of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York found that those procedures were adequate
to imply a desire to protect the privilege, making the acciden-
tal production truly inadvertent.'76 Aramony is but one exam-
ple of the dozen or so cases that have confronted virtually the
same factual situation and determined that an accidental dis-
closure within a large document production does not waive
privilege if attorneys used established procedures for review.177
others. 219 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2000).
17 Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), 160 F.R.D. 437, 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
17. 969 F. Supp. 226, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 236-37 (finding the document review procedures "extensive and rigor-
ous").
17 See, e.g., Laquila Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 98 Civ. 5920,
1999 WL 232901 (S.D.N.Y. April 21, 1999) (finding no waiver where attorney's
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Similarly, there is another line of document production
cases that differs only in that the attorneys demonstrated a
lack of concern about procedures, resulting in waiver. In SEC
v. Cassano,17 for example, defense attorneys inspected about
fifty cartons of documents at the SEC's regional office to deter-
mine what they wanted produced during discovery. An expe-
rienced staff attorney for the SEC had reviewed the cartons
and removed privileged documents, but defense attorneys
found a 100-page draft memo prepared by the SEC staff that
weighed the evidence against the defendant, provided legal
precautions in reviewing short 400-page file were adequate, and where discovery
was in early stages); Fry v. McCall, No. 95 Civ. 1915, 1998 WL 273035 (S.D.N.Y.
May 28, 1998) (finding no waiver where handwritten note was disclosed in five
cartons of documents, even though note was not marked confidential); Baker's Aid
v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., No. 87 Civ. 0937, 1988 WL 138254 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
19, 1988) (finding no waiver because the defendant took reasonable precautions to
segregate and review documents and only one document out of 5,000 had been
inadvertently produced); United States v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108,
116 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding no waiver where company inadvertently turned over
one document among thousands of pages that were produced, and asked for its
return as soon as it realized the mistake a few weeks later); Bank Brussels Lam-
bert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), 160 F.R.D. 437, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no
waiver where lawyers took normal document production precautions, including
segregating documents from privileged documents, moved quickly once they real-
ized mistake, and litigation involved over 100,000 documents); Lloyds Bank v. Re-
public of Ecuador, No. 96 Civ. 1789, 1997 WL 96591 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1997) (find-
ing no waiver where attorneys reviewed documents carefully); Hydraflow, Inc. v.
Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 628 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding no waiver after brief
examination of defensible security precautions); Martin v. Valley Nat'l Bank of
Ariz., No. 89 Civ. 8361, 1992 WL 196798 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1992) (finding no waiv-
er where sufficient precautions, only a "negligible" sixteen days passed until dis-
covery, and only five documents out of 50,000 pages were produced); Desai v. Am.
Int'l Underwriters, No. 91 Civ. 7735, 1992 WL 110731 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1992)
(finding no waiver where document was part of a large production, precautions
were taken, and defendants moved promptly); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no waiver where some
precautions were taken, and only a few documents were produced in large selec-
tion of documents); Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l, No. 90 Civ. 6328, 1991
WL 274328 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1991) (finding no waiver where defendant took pre-
cautions, and only produced three privileged documents out of a large production);
cf. Prescient Partners v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7590, 1997 WL
736726 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1997) (finding that joint agreement on confidentiality
provided that both parties respect any claim of inadvertent production and, in
dicta, finding that there was no waiver anyway because attorneys took precautions
to have attorney review documents, moved quickly for a comprehensive review of
all productions after learning that a claim of inadvertence would be challenged,
production was large in scope, and there was no reliance on the documents).
178 189 F.R.D. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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analysis, and discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the
case.179 Having found the document, the lawyers asked the
SEC's paralegal if she would photocopy and produce it for
them, and she, in turn, asked the lead counsel for his permis-
sion.' Without reviewing the document, the SEC attorney
gave her instructions to copy it.'' The district court found
that this failure to review that particular document waived
privilege because the lawyer had a specific opportunity to en-
sure that a privileged document was not produced and yet did
nothing.12 Numerous other cases have also resulted in waiv-
er, where the producing attorneys did not take sufficient pre-
cautions in document review procedures"' or where the at-
torneys inadvertently disclosed confidential material in a court
filing."M
17 Id. at 83-84. The district court understatedly commented that "[d]efense
counsel understandably were very much interested in this document." Id. at 84.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Cassano, 189 F.R.D. at 85-86. The court stated:
The document may have been in the materials intended for production,
in which case the experienced staff attorney simply overlooked it. Alter-
natively, the document was not there when the review was made, the
attorney missed nothing, but the document was inserted into the file
after the review was completed. In the latter, [the SEC] took insufficient
precautions-none, so far that the record discloses-to ensure that the
integrity of the boxes that had been reviewed for privileged materials
was maintained . . . . Any other precautions that were taken, and there
certainly were some, fade into insignificance in the face of such careless-
ness.
Id.
18 See Liz Claiborne, Inc. v. Mademoiselle Knitwear, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 2064,
1996 WL 668862 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1996) (finding waiver where attorney took no
precautions to create privilege log and never reviewed notes for privilege); Bank
Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 93 Civ. 5928, 1996 WL 944011
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1996) (finding waiver where attorney took no precautions to
prevent documents from falling into opposing counsel's hands, including failing to
mark documents as privileged and confidential); Zurn Indus., Inc. v. J.A. Jones
Constr. Co., No. 90 Civ. 1161, 1992 WL 198139 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1992) (finding
waiver where the defendant failed to take sufficient precautions by failing to in-
ventory own records before giving the other side access); Eigenheim Bank v.
Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding waiver where defendants inex-
plicably produced same privileged document twice).
1 4 See Local 851 v. Kuehne & Nagel Air Freight, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d. 127, 134
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that counsel's attaching a privileged letter to a court
filing waived privilege where counsel failed to label the letter as confidential, to
employ a procedure for separating confidential communications, or to adequately
review documents before they left the office); United States v. Gangi, 1 F. Supp.
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Unfortunately, these cases do not provide particularly
helpful guidance in determining the types of precautions that
attorneys should take for transmitting documents through the
Internet. A different dynamic is at work: although lawyers
might indeed use the Internet to facilitate document produc-
tion, and any privileged material accidentally transmitted that
way would be reviewed in light of those precedents, the central
question addressed in this Article is whether attorneys risk
waiver if they are transmitting confidences that they do not
intend to publish to the other side. Thus, cases involving docu-
ment production might establish the fundamental contours of
the applicable test-particularly in the focus on the importance
of adequate precautions-but they are factually inapposite.
A better ground upon which to base the analysis, in fact,
comes from a different type of case, one not involving inadver-
tent disclosure but centering instead on the types of precau-
tions an attorney has to take to maintain a seal of confidential-
ity over a communication. In In re Horowitz, Judge Friendly,
writing for the court, held that a party had waived privilege
over a set of documents that had been left with an accountant
for the attorney." In this instance, the accountant was not
holding the records so that he could assist the attorney in their
understanding, which would have brought the accountant
within the privilege as an agent of the attorney.' Rather,
Judge Friendly indicated that the attorney had placed the
documents in the accountant's possession as a matter of conve-
nience and practical necessity, to help avoid their seizure by
authorities."7 Consequently, the court found that leaving the
documents in the care of someone outside the confidential
relationship eliminated "whatever privilege the communication
may have originally possessed, whether because disclosure is
2d. 256, 264, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding waiver where the government inadver-
tently produced an internal memorandum to the other side because of a long se-
ries of internal mistakes).
"' In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1973).
1s See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding that
accountant working at the direction of attorney to assist in preparation of case
was agent for purposes of the attorney client privilege).
" See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 74. The court indicated that the client could
not store the documents at his own house, because he was selling his house to
"leave for parts unknown," presumably because of the ongoing criminal investiga-
tion that spurred the grand jury inquiry. Id.
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viewed as an indication that confidentiality is no longer intend-
ed or as a waiver of the privilege."188
This seems a much more analogous situation than the
document production cases to the arguments that could be
raised about sending privileged communications through
cyberspace. Like the client in Horowitz, who put the documents
in a position where someone outside the privilege could view
them, attorneys who use Internet-based communication tech-
nologies without encryption risk loss of the privilege. As Judge
Friendly stated, "It is not asking too much to insist that if a
client wishes to preserve the privilege under such circumstanc-
es, he must take some affirmative action to preserve confiden-
tiality."1
89
The inquiry, then, boils down to what type of affirmative
action, or what type of precautions, an attorney has to take if
using new technologies to communicate with his clients. And
that brings us back to Judge Hand and the two principles
articulated in The T.J. Hooper9 ° and Carroll Towing. 9' In
those two opinions, Judge Hand presciently established a func-
tional two-step analysis for determining whether and how we
should adapt technological changes into our practices.
The T. J. Hooper involved two tug boats that ran into high
seas off the coast of Atlantic City and lost a pair of coal barges,
perhaps gambling (and presaging the spirit of the environs)
that they could make it through a rough patch of sea. 92 The
cargo owners sued the two tug boats, arguing in part that the
tug boats were not seaworthy because they were not equipped
with radios and could not access weather reports, dire predic-
tions that would have dissuaded a reasonable ship's cap-
tain.9 ' At the time, few ships were equipped with radio
' Id. at 81.
'8' Id. at 82.
" The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1932).
" United States v. Carroll Towing, Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
"' The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 737. This was not the only claim from the car-
go owners. Judge Hand also found that the barges themselves were not seaworthy,
rendering the ship owners liable: "IT]he barges were certainly not seaworthy in
fact, and we do not think that the record shows affirmatively the exercise of due
diligence to examine them." Id. at 738.
13 See id. at 739. The judge concluded that "prudent masters, who had received
the second warning, would have found the risk more than the exigency warrant-
ed."
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equipment, even though suitable sets were available and rea-
sonably priced,'94 but Judge Hand, writing for the Second
Circuit, decided that this "general custom" was no defense to
negligence:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common pru-
dence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have
unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It may
never set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so im-
perative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission.'
Thirteen years later came United States v. Carroll Towing,
Co.,'96 and another sinking barge, which this time raised the
issue of whether the owner had been slack in caring for his
own ship by failing to maintain a presence on board.'97 Judge
... Id. at 739. In a brief to the court, the cargo owners argued that "it is suffi-
ciently well known to enable this court to take judicial notice of the fact that by
March, 1928, radio receiving apparatus had reached a relatively high degree of
development and was to be found everywhere." HENRY M. HART, JR. AND ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW, 409 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (citing Brief
of Cargo Owners at 30, The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1932) (No. 430)). Later, the brief stated emphatically, " 'He that hath ears to hear,
let him hear.' We may without irreverence add to this: 'And if he has not ears to
hear what is meant for him to hear, he should provide himself with them.' " Id.
at 413 (citing Brief of Cargo Owners at 53, The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (No. 430)).
... The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740. The Judge went on to declare the sets
necessary: "But here there was no custom at all as to receiving sets; some had
them, some did not; the most that can be urged is that they had not yet become
general. Certainly in such a case we need not pause; when some have thought a
device necessary, at least we may say that they were right, and the others too
slack." Id. at 740.
19 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
'9 Back then, the Second Circuit's docket was apparently as heavy in sunken
ship cases as it now is in drug sentencing appeals, which make for far less color-
ful fact narratives. The details of the incident were convoluted, but essentially the
barge had been tied to several other barges in a small flotilla off the harbor in
what Judge Hand called "the North River." Id. at 170. Unfortunately, the barges
were not adequately tied together to the pier, and they broke away, damaging and
sinking the "Anna C." Id. at 171. Evidence indicated that the tug boats could have
kept the "Anna C." afloat had the owner placed someone on board who could have
told them that she was taking on water. Id. Judge Hand thus found that the
owner could recover for the damages from the ship actually becoming adrift, but
not for the sinking damages that could have been averted had a representative
been on board to notify the tugs that the boat was leaking. Id. at 172 ("[I]f the
bargee had been on board, and had done his duty to his employer, he would have
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Hand ruled that the owner's duty was a function of the proba-
bility that some accident might occur, the seriousness of the
potential injury, and the burden of taking adequate precau-
tions to avoid the injury.9 ' Judge Hand further articulated
the famous "Hand formula" for making this calculation: "[Ihf
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P; i.e., whether B less than PL."'99
This doctrine, which "played so seminal a role in the eco-
nomic analysis of law,""0 refines the first principle from The
T.J. Hooper, the two cases providing an elegant two-part exam-
ination. First, lawyers who have access to technologies that
will safeguard the privilege should be aware that their failure
to keep up with the state of the art may not protect them even
if they adhere to a general custom advising them that such
safeguards are unnecessary. Second, in the event of mishap,
their failure to take proper precautions will be reviewed in
light of the severity of the eventual harm, the probability of
injury, and the cost of taking more reasonable precautions.
Applied to the inquiry at hand, the test makes crystal-
clear that attorneys need be careful in taking advantage of the
new Internet-based information technologies. The prevailing
consensus that encryption for e-mail is not necessary has
evolved without any judicial settlements, relying instead on
state boards and an ABA constituted largely of practicing at-
torneys with every incentive to both sanctify what has become
a common practice among attorneys and expand the reaches of
the attorney-client privilege (even while courts warn that the
privilege is narrowly applied). If an attorney does use these
technologies, and does suffer a breach of security resulting in
exposure of confidential information, his only argument
against waiver is that he understood the medium to be safe.
But that custom, like the custom in The T.J. Hooper that radi-
os were not obligatory, will not necessarily protect attorneys
who have the poor luck to be the first guinea pigs in this par-
gone below at once, examined the injury, and called for help from [the tugs].
Moreover, it is clear that these tugs could have kept the barge afloat, until they
had safely beached her, and saved her cargo.")
198 Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
199 Id.
29 Posner, supra note 11, at 513.
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ticular judicial-societal experiment. Unless the attorney can
point to some type of precaution, some type of action that he
took to protect the privilege other than trusting the inherent
chaotic structure of the medium, he is at terrible risk of losing
the privilege.
Moreover, in making the initial determination as to wheth-
er those precautions are necessary, outside of the reliance on
custom, attorneys will likely find that the "Hand Formula"
weighs in favor of adopting safety protocols. Unquestionably,
the cost of adopting security precautions like encryption is
high, not just in financial terms but in the added complexity of
using the new technologies. Even now, as encryption programs
become cheaper and less complicated, they still add a level of
complexity to any transmission. And it may seem that the
probability of harm is low, in that interception of electronic
transmissions is no trivial endeavor. But encryption is indeed
an available technology, and attorneys should consider that
those two factors pale in comparison to the extent of the injury
that could result from an inadvertent waiver of the attorney-
client privilege: harm to the client, harm to the case, or harm
to the attorney's ethical standing. Waivers of privilege are not
merely damaging, they can be catastrophic. Moreover, even if
the attorney defeats an attempt to destroy the evidentiary
privilege, the harm to the client through exposure of sensitive
material (and the concomitant damage to the attorney-client
privilege) cannot be undone. A bell may be un-rung in a court
of law, but not in the outside world.
Numerous occasions exist, of course, in which attorneys
need not be that scrupulous about using safety mechanisms for
Internet communications. Most attorney-client communications
are trivial, relating peripherally to the representation but not
touching on any sensitive material. But for those occasions
when an attorney is transmitting or storing information that
she would not want others outside the privilege to see, she
should be mindful of Judge Hand's principles on technological
integration and think about how she would try to justify pre-
cautions against a potential breach in the privilege.
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CONCLUSION
Complicated new technologies pose complicated new legal
problems, and the Internet is an especially perplexing example.
Arguments that lawyers need take no special precautions when
using these new technologies fundamentally misunderstand
the pace and complexity of technological change, in assuming
that the Internet is a safe medium because of its inherently
decentralized structure and in presuming that encryption tech-
nology will never catch up to become an available option.
These arguments also seem to misapprehend the nature of the
attorney-client privilege, forgetting how narrow the privilege is
supposed to be and how it is an exception to the general rule
that information should be admissible.
Mostly, though, it seems self-evident that if lawyers wish
to use new technologies, they have an obligation to understand
and use them wisely. It is one thing to rely on custom for well-
established procedures, such as the document review proce-
dures discussed in most Second Circuit inadvertent waiver
cases. It is quite another, though, to rely on custom for the use
of modern, dynamic, changeable technologies. If you are going
to go out on the cutting edge, be mindful that it can be sharp.
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